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ALTERNATIVE WAYS OUT: A REMEDIAL
ROAD MAP FOR THE USE OF ALTERNATIVE
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AS VOTING RIGHTS
ACT REMEDIES
STEVEN J. MULROY*

In this Article, Steven Mulroy argues that jurisdictionsattempting
to correct minority vote dilution should employ alternative
electoral systems. Such alternative voting schemes would allow
jurisdictions to maximize minority votes without creating voting
districtsbased on race, thereby avoiding the strictscrutiny analysis
of Shaw v. Reno. Of the three alternative voting systems-limited
voting, cumulative voting, and preference voting-the Article
advocates preference voting as the best of the three because it
maximizes proportionality of representation and the incentive for
cross-racialand other coalitions while minimizing the problems of
strategic voting and intra-group competition. Finally, the Article
finds alternative voting systems particularlyappropriatein judicial
election cases because such systems can serve a jurisdiction's
"linkage" interest.
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INTRODUCTION

The last few years have seen a renewed interest in the use of
alternative electoral systems' to enhance minority representation.
Recent U.S. Supreme Court cases invalidating minority congressional
districts as "racial gerrymanders '2 have curtailed the ability of
legislators and litigators to use the traditional remedy for perceived
minority dilution-drawing districts designed to enhance minority
voting strength. This inability has triggered a reexamination of
alternative electoral systems as a means to address minority vote
dilution without confronting the constitutional difficulties 4 posed by
1. By "alternative electoral systems," I mean cumulative voting, limited voting, and
preference voting (also known as the "single transferable vote" or "the Hare system").
These electoral schemes are designed to enhance the opportunity of voting minorities to
win representation in accord with their voting strength and to ameliorate the "winnertake-all" aspect of traditional at-large elections or district elections.
2. See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996);
Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Reno,
509 U.S. 630 (1993).
3. See infra Part I.A. "Minority vote dilution" occurs when "the voting strength of
an ethnic or racial minority group is diminished or canceled out by the bloc vote of the
majority."

Chandler Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution: An Overview, in MINORITY

VOTE DILUTION 1, 4 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984). It is a special case of the general
vote dilution process, in which "election laws or practices, either singly or in concert,
combine with systematic bloc voting among an identifiable group to diminish the voting
strength of at least one other group." Id.
4. See, e.g., John Anderson, Go Back to the Drawing Board to Make More Votes
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the race-conscious imperatives of the Voting Rights Act 5 and the

race-neutral imperatives of the recent Supreme Court cases. Legal
and social science scholars echo this trend.6 Also, a district court
recently imposed an alternative electoral system as a remedy in a
voting rights case, basing its decision on precisely the constitutional
dilemma raised by race-conscious districting.7

In a recent article,' I joined the chorus of advocates for
alternative electoral systems. In addition to advocating alternative

schemes as remedies for minority vote dilution under section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act--as "the way out" of the dilemma described

above-I proposed a new legal standard to be used when section 2
plaintiffs seek to replace illegal, dilutive systems with alternative
schemes rather than with the traditional single-member district
remedy.'" I argued that this new legal standard could be used to
challenge either a dilutive districting system or a dilutive traditional,
winner-take-all, at-large election. In short, that article discussed what
should be required to establish Voting Rights Act liability when the

end result sought was the imposition of an alternative electoral
system.
With that preliminary question addressed, this Article tackles the
Count, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Jan. 12, 1996, at 18; Editorial, Better Politics from an
Old Idea, CHI. TRIB., May 30, 1995, § 1, at 12 [hereinafter Better Politics];Michael Lind,
Alice Doesn't Vote Here Anymore, MOTHER JONES, Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 53; William
Raspberry, Editorial, Superdistrictsin North Carolina,WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 1998, at A23;
Redistricting: Look Beyond PoliticalFighting Over Single-Member Districts, CHARLOTIE
OBSERVER, Apr. 24, 1998, at A16; Symposium, Reflecting All of Us, BOSTON REV., Feb.Mar. 1998 (providing a series of articles by various authors in a symposium issue devoted
to proportional representation systems).
5. Pub. L. No. 89-110,79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,1973 to
1973bb-1 (1994)).
6. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting:
Drawing ConstitutionalLines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 627-28 (1993);
Richard Engstrom et al., One Person, Seven Votes: The Cumulative Voting Experience in
Chilton County, Alabama, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND REPRESENTATION: SHAW V.
RENO AND THE FUTURE OF VOTING RIGHTS 285,287 (Anthony A. Peacock ed., 1997).
7. See McCoy v. Chicago Heights, 6 F. Supp. 2d 973, 982-83 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
8. See Steven J. Mulroy, The Way Out A Legal Standardfor Imposing Alternative
ElectoralSystems as Voting Rights Remedies, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 333 (1998).
9. Voting Rights Act, § 2, 79 Stat. at 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973).
Section 2 prohibits any voting or electoral "standard, practice or procedure" that "results
in a denial or abridgement" of rights "on account of" race or color. Id.; see also Act of
Aug. 6, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400, 401 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973b(f)(2)) (prohibiting the same acts against a language minority group).
10. The new standard would substitute the "threshold of exclusion" formula
applicable to alternative systems for the geographic compactness standard used under the
canonical districting approach. See Mulroy, supra note 8, at 378-80; infra notes 62-65 and
accompanying text.
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tougher problems arising in the remedial phase. It answers two
questions pertinent to any use of alternative schemes pursuant to the
Voting Rights Act, once liability has been established. First, where
both a traditional, single-member district remedy and an alternative
remedy are demographically feasible, what standards should courts
and litigants use in choosing between the two? Second, what
standards should be used in choosing among the three alternative
electoral systems-cumulative voting, limited voting, and preference
voting?
Part I sets out the necessary background on minority vote
dilution, section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the Supreme Court's
"racial gerrymander" cases, and the workings of alternative electoral
systems. It also summarizes the new liability analysis advanced in the
previous article. Part II answers the first question posed above by
arguing that courts initially should defer to the defendant
jurisdiction's preference and to any applicable state law restrictions.
When neither of these benchmarks speaks to the issue, courts should
have a general preference for alternative systems. Part III answers
the second question posed above by advocating preference voting as
the best of the three alternatives because, among other things, it most
effectively enhances minority voting strength without penalizing
intra-group competition within a particular minority group. Part IV
applies these principles to the special case of judicial elections, where
courts adjudicating Voting Rights Act challenges have articulated
policy concerns unique to the election of judges.
I. ALTERNATIVE ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AS THE SOLUTION TO A
STATUTORY-CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA

A.

Vote Dilution and Single-Member Districts

Congress passed the Voting Rights Act in 1965 to address the
problem of racial discrimination in voting. When enforcement of the
Act in the 1960s and 1970s led to increased voter registration among
formerly excluded minority groups," voting rights advocates
discovered still another hurdle to effective participation by these
groups in American democracy: minority vote dilution. Electoral
11. Evidence regarding the increase of minority voter registration in the years
following the passage of the Voting Rights Act can be found in James E. Alt, The Impact
of the Voting Rights Act on Black and White Voter Registration in the South, in QUIET
REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACr OF THE VOTING RIGHTs Acr, 1965-1990, at
351, 352-54 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994) (summarizing findings).
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systems in many places were designed to prevent minority voters
from exerting any real influence in electoral outcomes, by catering to
the bloc voting patterns of white majorities. This vote dilution was
accomplished in two ways: through the use of at-large electoral
systems and through districts "gerrymandered" to minimize minority
voting strength.
The traditional, winner-take-all form of at-large election wasand is-commonly used for local elections such as those for city
councils or county commissions. In at-large elections, voters from the
entire jurisdiction vote to fill open seats on jurisdiction-wide
legislative bodies. Under this method of election, each voter may cast
only one vote for each candidate for a particular office, up to the
number of empty seats, with the top vote-getters filling these seats. A
related approach elects several representatives each from large
"multimember" districts. Within each multimember district, elections
operate in a manner similar to at-large elections. Most local
jurisdictions in the United States use single-member districts, winnertake-all at-large elections, or some combination of the two.' a
It has long been acknowledged that when voting is polarized
along racial or ethnic lines, these traditional or winner-take-all atlarge/multimember methods allow the white majority to vote as a bloc
and fill all seats, ensuring the defeat of candidates backed by minority
voters and thereby "diluting" minority voting strength. 13 For
example, imagine a five-member county commission in a county
where forty percent of the population is black.' 4 When, as is
commonly the case, black voters consistently prefer different
candidates from white voters, the three-fifths white majority can
continually shut out the black minority and fill all five seats with
white-preferred candidates. Even though the politically cohesive
voting bloc of black voters represents two-fifths of the populace, it is
unable to elect a single candidate of choice. This inability is the
12. See Edward Still, Alternatives to Single-Member Districts, in MINORITY VOTE
DILUTION, supra note 3, at 249, 249. The dominance of these systems is a historical
product stemming from their use in England.
13. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613,616 (1982); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1,
16 n.10 (1975); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 158-59 (1971).
14. For much of this Article, I use black persons in examples involving minority
groups suffering vote dilution. These examples should be understood to apply equally to
members of any minority group protected under the Voting Rights Act.
15. This exact result occurred in Granville County, North Carolina, the site of a vote
dilution lawsuit under the Voting Rights Act. See McGhee v. Granville County, 860 F.2d
110, 113 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting that although blacks made up 43% of the population of
Granville County, no black had ever been elected). Situations like this one have been, and
continue to be, common. See, e.g., Teague v. Attala County, 92 F.3d 283, 285 (5th Cir.
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inherent result of the particular method of election interacting with
the preferences of white voters.
Minority vote dilution also occurs in settings involving singlemember districts-geographic electoral units from which only a single
candidate is elected-such as in elections for the U.S. House of
Representatives. Just as the legislature can politically gerrymander
these districts to elect Democrats or Republicans disproportionately,
they also can be drawn to elect white-preferred candidates
disproportionately and to under-represent minority-preferred
candidates.
The canonical remedy for minority vote dilution stemming from
electoral methods (that is, through at-large or multimember systems)
and gerrymandered districting has been to draw single-member
districts with significant minority populations. 6 Litigants can force
the creation of such minority-oriented districts through lawsuits under
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
B.

Section 2 and Thornburg v. Gingles

Section 2 prohibits states and political subdivisions from using
any standards, practices, or procedures that abridge the right to vote
17
of any member of a protected class of racial and ethnic minorities.
In 1982, Congress amended this provision to clarify that it intended to
apply a "results test" to section 2 vote dilution claims.'" Plaintiffs do
not have to show a discriminatory purpose on the part of the
government body implementing the challenged electoral practice;
rather, a plaintiff can prevail simply by showing that the "totality of
circumstances" reveals that "the political processes leading to
nomination or election ... are not equally open to participation" by
1996) (noting that no blacks had been elected at-large in Attala County in modern times,
despite blacks making up nearly 40% of the population).
16. See, e.g., Westwego Citizens for Better Gov't v. City of Westwego, 946 F.2d 1109,
1124 (5th Cir. 1991) (ordering the creation of a remedial districting plan to remedy
minority vote dilution); Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325, 355 (E.D. La. 1983) (requiring
the creation of a black-majority congressional district in New Orleans).
17. The Voting Rights Act bars voting-related discrimination against persons on the
basis of race, color, national origin, or membership in a "language minority group." Act of
Aug. 6, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 203, 89 Stat. 400, 401 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973b(f)(2) (1994)); see Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437,
437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994)). The Act defines language
minorities to include Asian-Americans, Hispanics, Native Americans, and Alaskan
Natives. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 14, 79 Stat. at 445 (codified as amended at 42

U.S.C. § 19731(c)(3) (1994)).
18. See Act of June 29, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1973b(c) (1994)).
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members of the protected class because these members "have less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives of their choice";"
purposeful discrimination by the entity implementing the challenged
electoral practice is not a required showing. The legislative history of
the amendment sets out a lengthy, nonexhaustive list of factors to be
considered under the "totality 21of circumstances,"2 commonly
referred to as the "Senate factors."1
In 1986, the Supreme Court clarified how courts were to
implement the "results test" amendments in Thomburg v. Gingles," a
section 2 challenge to certain North Carolina state legislative
multimember districts. 3 In Gingles, the Court held that plaintiffs
must establish three "preconditions" in order to make out a prima
facie case of vote dilution in violation of section 2: (1) the ,minority
group is sufficiently numerous and compact to form a majority in a
single-member district; (2) the minority group is politically cohesive
(that is, its members tend to vote alike); and (3) the white majority
usually votes as a bloc sufficient to defeat the minority's preferred
candidate.24 The first of these preconditions is often referred to
simply as "compactness,"' 2 and the second and third are often
referred to together as "racial bloc voting" or "racially polarized
voting."26 If plaintiffs fail to prove any of these three preconditions,
they lose. Even if they can establish all three, the plaintiffs still have
to prove a violation under the "totality of the circumstances" analysis,
which incorporates the "Senate factors."'2 7
19. Id.42 U.S.C. § 1973(b).
20. The Senate Judiciary Committee majority report on the Act lists the following
factors, focused on the particular defendant's state or political subdivision: (1) the history
of official discrimination affecting the right to vote; (2) the degree to which voting was
racially polarized; (3) the use of other dilutive voting procedures such as majority vote
requirements; (4) any denial of minority candidate access to candidate slating processes;
(5) socioeconomic disparities on the part of the minority group members; (6) racial
appeals in campaigns; (7) the degree of minority candidate electoral success; (8)the
degree of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the concerns of the minority
group; and (9) the extent to which the policy underlying the challenged practice or
procedure is tenuous. See S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 177,205-07.
21. See, e.g., Solomon v. Liberty County Comm'rs, 166 F.3d 1135, 1141 (11th Cir.
1999) (referring to the "Senate factors").
22. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
23. See id. at 34-35.
24. See id. at 50-51.
25. See Teague v. Attala County, 92 F.3d 283,287 (5th Cir. 1996).
26. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 55.
27. See id.
at 43-52.
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For years before Gingles, and with even more vigor later, voting
rights litigants used section 2 to force the creation of numerous
minority-oriented districts at the congressional, state, and local
levels.' Some, but not all, of these districts were oddly shaped.
Sometimes the districts were oddly shaped because that was the only
way to create majority-minority districts while still satisfying oneperson, one-vote concerns.29 At other times, the odd shapes were the
result of incumbent legislators' efforts to satisfy the Voting Rights
Act while simultaneously protecting their own incumbencies. 0 The
minority districts, however, were often no more oddly shaped than
non-minority districts drawn by the same jurisdictions.3 1 The degree
of non-compactness of both minority and non-minority districts
increased over time as improvements in computer technology allowed
more sophisticated analysis of demographic data by drawers of
redistricting plans.32 Eventually, the race-influenced oddities were
bound to attract the attention of the Supreme Court, and in 1993, one
such district did.
C. Shaw v. Reno, Its Progeny, and Reverse-Discrimination"Racial
Gerrymanders"

In Shaw v. Reno,33 the Supreme Court considered a challenge to
North Carolina's Twelfth Congressional District, a long, snake-like
minority-majority district that stretched along Interstate 85.31 The
28. See, e.g., Westwego Citizens for Better Gov't v. City of Westwego, 946 F.2d 1109,
1124 (5th Cir. 1991) (ordering the creation of a local remedial districting plan to remedy
minority vote dilution); De Grandy v. Wetherell, 815 F. Supp. 1550, 1560 (N.D. Fla. 1992)
(invalidating a Florida state legislative districting plan), aff'd in part,rev'd in partsub nom.
Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994); Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325, 355 (E.D.
La. 1983) (requiring the creation of a black-majority congressional district in New
Orleans).
29. See, e.g., In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, Special
Apportionment Session 1992, 601 So. 2d 543, 546 (Fla. 1992) (explaining the odd shape of
a state senate district as resulting from the need to satisfy one-person, one-vote concerns);
see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 559 (1964) (explaining the one-person, one-vote
requirement).
30. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 673 n.10 (1993) (citing assertions that the
odd shape of North Carolina's congressional districts can be explained by incumbent
interests).
31. See, e.g., Lawyer v. Department of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 580-81 (1997) (upholding
a constitutional challenge to a minority state senate district in part on this ground); Miller
v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 940 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing evidence to this
effect regarding a Georgia minority congressional district).
32 See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 961 (1996) (plurality opinion) (emphasizing
evidence of advanced redistricting computer abilities).
33. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
34. See id. at 630, 633-35.
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Court recognized a new constitutional cause of action challenging an
oddly shaped minority district as a "racial gerrymander" under the
Fourteenth Amendment." This new cause of action is "analytically
distinct" from the traditional vote dilution claim and does not require
proof that a particular group's vote is in fact diluted.3 6 Instead, the
harm caused by such "gerrymandering" is two-fold: It reinforces the
stereotype that members of the same racial group think and vote
alike (stigmatic harm), and it encourages elected officials from such
districts to represent only the members of their racial group rather
than the district as a whole (representational harm). 37
As explained by the Court in Miller v. Johnson38 and Bush v.
Vera,39 a Shaw plaintiff confronts a threshold question as to whether
race is the "predominant factor" driving the configuration of the
challenged minority district.40 To make this showing, the plaintiff
must prove that the challenged district "subordinated [to race]
traditional race-neutral districting principles," such as "compactness,
contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions or communities
defined by actual shared interests." 41 If the plaintiff fails to make this
showing, the court will uphold the minority district, and the analysis
ends. If the plaintiff meets the "predominant factor" threshold, the
constitutional standard of strict scrutiny applies: The court will
invalidate the district unless its configuration was narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling governmental interest.4' Although the Court has
not detailed a definitive list of governmental interests that would
support a Shaw-type racial gerrymander, compliance with section 2 is
likely to be one such interest.43
35. See id. at 657.
36. See id. at 650-52. That is, even if a Shaw plaintiff could not point to a cohesive
group that would have less of an opportunity to elect candidates of choice as a result of the
challenged minority district, or that would be significantly underrepresented in proportion
to its share of the population, the plaintiff could still prevail if it made out the other
elements of the Shaw claim.
37. See id. at 647-48; see also United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 744 (1995)
(providing further explanation of stigmatic and representational harm).
38. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).

39. 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (plurality opinion).
40. See Bush, 517 U.S. at 959 (plurality opinion); Miller,515 U.S. at 916.
41. Miller,515 U.S. at 916.
42. See id. at 916, 920.
43. In Bush, Justice O'Connor argued that compliance with the "results test" of
section 2 could be a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify a "racial gerrymander"
subject to strict scrutiny. Bush, 517 U.S. at 992 (O'Connor, J., concurring). This position
is in accord with the views of four other Supreme Court Justices. See id. at 1007, 1034-35
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer); id. at 1046, 1065
(Souter, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer). The remaining Justices
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The Shaw line of cases has curtailed severely the ability of
legislators, litigants, and courts to create single-member districts that

provide minority voters with a realistic opportunity to elect
candidates of their choice.'

In so doing, the cases create a dilemma

for anyone interested in remedying minority vote dilution. Persons
interested in assuring fair representation to minorities must steer a
narrow middle course between the Scylla of the Voting Rights Act,
which requires that race be taken into account when drawing districts,
and the Charybdis of Shaw, which requires that race not be used "too
much." The performers in the upcoming year 2000 redistricting circus
will be walking a tightrope, and no net can cushion them from the risk
of protracted, expensive litigation and disrupted election cycles.
These pitfalls can be avoided, however, by eschewing districting
altogether and adopting alternative electoral systems.4 5
D. Alternative ElectoralSystems
Although at-large systems used in the United States have

traditionally been winner-take-all, other varieties exist and have been
employed.4 6

These systems use special voting rules designed to

who have dealt with the issue have assumed this point without deciding it. See id. at 977
(plurality opinion) (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy); id. at 996
(Kennedy, J., concurring); id at 1003 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (joined by
Justice Scalia).
44. Almost every Supreme Court opinion considering a Shaw challenge on the merits
has invalidated the challenged districts and issued language cautioning against over-using
race in making redistricting decisions. See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 88-89 (1997)
(criticizing the proposed minority congressional districts); Bush, 517 U.S. at 957 (plurality
opinion) (invalidating three minority congressional districts in Texas); Shaw v. Hunt, 517
U.S. 899, 917 (1996) (invalidating a North Carolina congressional district); Miller, 515 U.S.
at 920-21 (invalidating a minority congressional district in Georgia). But see Lawyer v.
Department of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 582 (1997) (upholding a minority state senate district
in Florida). The repeated Supreme Court criticism has, to put it mildly, the potential for
causing a chilling effect on the creation of minority-oriented single-member districts.
45. By advocating this course, I do not mean to suggest agreement with the Shaw line
of decisions, which I believe (for reasons outside the scope of this Article) the Court to
have decided wrongly. Although I consider alternative electoral methods often to be
preferable to single-member districts, see infra notes 124-63 and accompanying text, I
consider such districts generally preferable to traditional, dilutive, "winner-take-all" atlarge methods of election and to district systems that fail to reflect fairly minority voting
strength. I acknowledge that there are circumstances in which minority districts are the
best vote dilution remedy.
46. There is no federal constitutional or statutory provision banning the use of
alternative electoral schemes or their adoption by federal courts. See Holder v. Hall, 512
U.S. 874, 897-99, 908-13 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); League of
United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 986 F.2d 728, 814-15 (5th Cir.),
rev'd on other grounds, 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc); United States v. Marengo
County Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1560 (11th Cir. 1984); Dillard v. Town of Louisville, 730
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enhance the ability of voting minorities to obtain representation.

Three such systems have a history of use in the United States. They
can be used in partisan or non-partisan elections and have been
discussed by courts and commentators as non-district alternative
voting rights remedies at the local level.47 These three systems are
limited voting, cumulative voting, and preference voting.48
In a limited voting system, a voter casts one vote per candidate to
fill a number of seats, but the total number of votes a voter may cast
is less than the total number of seats to be filled.49 For example, a
voter might be allowed to vote for only four candidates to fill five
seats on a city council. This limitation is designed to prevent the
majority "from making a clean sweep of all seats by voting a straight
ticket." 50
Limited voting systems are used in several local
jurisdictions in North Carolina, Alabama, Connecticut, and
Pennsylvania. 51
F. Supp. 1546, 1548 (M.D. Ala. 1990).
47. See, e.g., Richard L. Engstrom, Modified Multi-Seat Election Systems as Remedies
for Minority Vote Dilution, 21 STETSON L. REv. 743, 756-66 (1992) (discussing court
cases).
48. The description of these three alternative systems that follows borrows from my
earlier article. For a more complete discussion of these systems, see Mulroy, supra note 8,
at 339-43.
Alternative electoral systems are often referred to as "proportional representation"
systems. This phrase raises two definitional concerns. First, although all three systems
tend to produce electoral results that are more "proportional" to voter preferences than
winner-take-all systems, only preference voting produces results that are reliably
"proportional" as a strictly defined, mathematical matter. Therefore, political scientists
consider only preference voting (also known as the "single transferable vote") to be an
example of "proportional representation," calling limited and cumulative voting "semiproportional" systems. DOUGLAS AMY, REAL CHOICES, NEW VOICES 186 (1993); Still,
supra note 12, at 258. Second, these systems should not be confused with the party-list,
parliamentary systems used in Europe. Party-line systems are also examples of
proportional representation, but they have distinct features alien to the American
experience, such as voting rules requiring voters to vote for parties, not candidates, and a
weak executive whose administration may be truncated by a vote of those legislators. See
AMY, supra, at 227-30. Such parliamentary features are not found in the alternative
systems used in the United States, and I do not advocate their adoption here. See Mulroy,
supra note 8, at 339.
49. See Still, supra note 12, at 253.
50. Id.
51. See Cleveland County Ass'n for Gov't by the People v. Cleveland County Bd.of
Comm'rs, 965 F. Supp. 72, 79 n.9 (D.D.C. 1997) (describing the use of limited voting
systems in three county and two municipal elected bodies in North Carolina), rev'd on
other grounds, 142 F.3d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 748 F. Supp.
819, 824 n.9 (M.D. Ala. 1990) (noting the use of limited voting systems in Alabama as the
result of litigation); AMY, supra note 48, at 233 app. A (noting the use of limited voting
systems in a "few cities and counties" in Connecticut and Pennsylvania); see also Dillard v.
Baldwin County Bd.of Educ., 686 F. Supp. 1459, 1461-62 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (tracing the
history of the Dillardlitigation).
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In a cumulative voting system, voters have a given number of
votes that they can distribute among the candidates any way they see
fit. The number of votes is usually, but need not be, equal to the
number of seats to be filled.52 For example, if a voter has five votes,
she can cast one vote each for her top five preferred candidates, she
can "plump" all five votes for one candidate for whom she has an
especially strong preference, or she can divide her votes three to two
between her top two choices. 3 Cumulative voting is used in
numerous jurisdictions in Texas and Alabama, as well as in Peoria,
Illinois.54 Historically, it was used to elect members of the Illinois
House of Representatives from 1870 to 1980. 5
In a preference voting or single transferable vote system,5 6 the
voter ranks the candidates in order of preference, putting beside each
candidate's name a "l," "2," etc., for as many candidates as she
wishes. The votes are counted in a series of rounds. In the first
52. See Note, Alternative Voting Systems as Remedies for Unlawful At-Large Systems,
144, 153 n.40 (1982).
53. The ability of voters to cast more than one vote is not a violation of the "oneperson, one-vote" constitutional principle because each voter is entitled to the same
number of votes. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 559 (1964) (explaining that the
gravamen of the principle is that "'one man's vote ... is to be worth as much as
another's'" (quoting Wesberry v. Sander, 376 U.S. 1, 8 (1964))); see also Orloski v. Davis,
564 F. Supp. 526, 530 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (upholding a limited voting scheme in a judicial
election over one-person, one-vote objections); LoFrisco v. Schaffer, 341 F. Supp. 743, 748
(D. Conn.) (same), affd, 409 U.S. 972 (1972); Kaelin v. Warden, 334 F. Supp. 602, 605
(E.D. Pa. 1971) (same); Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act
and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1088, 1148 n.332 (1991)
(citing additional sources and explaining why these voting systems are consistent with the
one-person, one-vote principle).
54. See Robert R. Brischetto & Richard L. Engstrom, Cumulative Voting and Latino
Representation: Exit Surveys in Fifteen Different Texas Communities, 78 SOC. SCI. Q. 973,
974 (1997) (describing the use of cumulative voting in Texas by at least 15 municipalities
and 26 school boards since 1991); Engstrom, supra note 47, at 757 (describing the use of
cumulative voting in Peoria, Illinois since 1991); Richard L. Engstrom et al., Limited and
Cumulative Voting in Alabama: An Assessment After Two Rounds of Elections, 6 NAT'L
POL. SCI. REV. 180, 185 (1997) (describing the use of cumulative voting in Alabama by
four municipalities plus the county commission and the school board of another county
since 1988).
55. See AMY, supranote 48, at 186.
56. Preference voting is sometimes referred to as the "single transferable vote" or the
"Hare system," which is a particular methodology for counting preference vote ballots.
Most recently, it has been called "choice voting." See Gideon Doron, Is the Hare Voting
Scheme Representative?, 41 J. POL. 918, 918-20 (1979) (discussing the "Hare system");
Robert Richie, Full Representation: The Future of ProportionalElection Systems, 87
NAT'L CIvic REv. 85, 86 (1998) (discussing the terms "single transferable vote" and
"choice voting"); Letter from Robert Richie, Executive Director, Center for Voting and
Democracy, to author (Apr. 19, 1999) (copy on file with the North CarolinaLaw Review)
(discussing all four terms).
92
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round, candidates netting more than a certain minimum amount of
first-choice votes57 win a seat. Their "excess" votes (that is, the
number of votes they received above the minimum) are reassigned to
other candidates based on the voters' second-choice selections. In the
second round, any candidates above the minimum quota of firstchoice votes after reassignment are seated. If there are no such
candidates, the lowest vote-getter is disqualified, and his votes are
reassigned on the same second-choice basis. This process of seating
and disqualifying candidates, and reassigning their votes accordingly,
continues through as many iterations as necessary to fill all the seats.58
Preference voting is used in several countries, including Ireland and
Australia. 9 In the United States, preference voting is used in city
council and school board elections in Cambridge, Massachusetts and
60
in local community school board elections in New York City.
Historically, it was used to elect city councils in approximately two
61
dozen American cities throughout the United States.
For each of these three alternative systems, a mathematical
formula expresses the minimum percentage of the electorate a

57. This minimum amount is calculated by dividing the total number of votes cast by
the number of seats to be filled plus one, and then adding one. This number is the socalled "Droop quota." Still, supra note 12, at 259. Thus, where three seats are to be filled,
the minimum amount is one more than 1/4 of the overall vote; where four seats are
available, it is one more than 1/5 of the vote; and so on.
58. See id. at 258-61. Good explanations of the counting process can be found in
AMY, supra note 48, at 230-31 app. A, 237-38 app. C, and Engstrom, supra note 47, at 76569. Engstrom provides a diagram that is particularly helpful. See Engstrom, supra note
47, at 766.
59. See AMY, supranote 48, at 18.
60. See id. at 18,137-38; Engstrom, supra note 47, at 766-67.
61. See Engstrom, supra note 47, at 766-67. These cities adopted preference voting at
various points from 1915 through 1950 and continued using it for periods varying from
several years to several decades. See Leon Weaver, The Rise, Decline, and Resurrectionof
ProportionalRepresentation in Local Governments in the United States, in ELECrORAL
LAWS AND THEIR POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 139, 139-41 (Bernard Grofman & Arend
Lijphart eds., 1986); see also Robert A. Burnham, Reform, Politics, and Race in Cincinnati:
ProportionalRepresentationand the City Charter Committee, 1924-1959, 23 J. URB. HIST.
131, 132 (1996) (describing the history of the use of proportional representation in Ohio
cities). New York City used preference voting to elect its city council from 1936 to 1947.
See Belle Zeller & Hugh A. Bone, The Repeal of P.R. in New York City-Ten Years in
Retrospect, 42 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 1127, 1127-33 (1948). Repeal of preference voting in
these cities often came as a result of public hostility to the election of blacks (as in
Cincinnati) or Communists (as in New York). See AMY, supra note 48, at 173 (noting the
role of fear of Communism in the New York repeal); Burnham, supra, at 153 (noting the
role of racial antagonism in the repeal of proportional representation in Cincinnati);
Richard L. Engstrom, Cincinnati's 1988 Proportional Representation Initiative, 9
ELECrORAL STUD. 217, 219-22 (1990) (same); Zeller & Bone, supra, at 1133 (noting the
role of fear of Communism in the New York repeal).
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politically cohesive minority group needs to be in order to assure the
election of at least one candidate of choice. This formula, universally
acknowledged by political scientists, is called the "threshold of
exclusion.'62

For both cumulative and preference voting, the threshold of
exclusion is:
1 /[(number of seats to be filled) + I].63
For limited voting, the threshold of exclusion formula is:
(number of votes each voter has) / [(number of votes each
voter has) + (numberof seats to be filled)].6
Thus, if five seats are up for election, and each voter has four votes,
the threshold for limited voting is 4/(4+5) = 4/9 = 44% of the vote.
Mathematically, the threshold is lower (and thus more accessible to
minority voters) when the number of votes each voter has is limited
to one.65 This result can be seen by holding the number of seats to be
filled constant and plugging in increasing integers for the number of
votes each voter has.
These alternative systems have proven to be effective at
enhancing the ability of racial and ethnic minority voters to elect
candidates of their choice.66 Importantly, they do so in a race-neutral
manner and thus do not raise Shaw concerns.67 For this reason,
commentators have argued that courts should use these alternative
systems as remedies in minority vote dilution lawsuits under the
Voting Rights Act.6 In many cases, such remedies have been
adopted by consent decree in section 2 litigation,69 but courts have
rarely imposed them as a section 2 remedy over the objection of a
defendant jurisdiction.7 °
62.
63.
64.
65.

See Still, supra note 12, at 256.
See id.
See Engstrom, supra note 47, at 758; Still, supra note 12, at 254.
See Still, supra note 12, at 254.

66. See infra Part II.C.1; see also Mulroy, supra note 8, at 349-50 (discussing the
effectiveness such systems have had in electing minority-preferred candidates).
67. See Mulroy, supra note 8, at 350-51.
68. See supra notes 4,6 and accompanying text.
69. For example, see Judge Myron Thompson's decisions approving cumulative
voting remedies as settlements to several of the related Dillard cases brought under the
Voting Rights Act. See Dillard v. Baldwin County Bd.of Educ., 686 F. Supp. 1459, 1460
(M.D. Ala. 1988) (describing the history of the Dillardlitigation).
70. See Mulroy, supra note 8, at 334 & n.8. In two of the four cases in which a federal
court imposed an alternative electoral remedy outside the context of a consent decree, an
appellate court vacated the remedial orders on fact-specific grounds. See Cane v.
Worcester County, 35 F.3d 921, 927-28 (4th Cir. 1994); McGhee v. Granville County, 860
F.2d 110, 121 (4th Cir. 1988). These two appellate opinions were tied to the particular
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In an earlier article, I have argued that courts have the authority
to impose such alternative remedies in section 2 cases. 71

This

authority is less controversial when the section 2 plaintiff has
established the three Gingles preconditions.7 2

Such remedies,

however, should also be available even when a plaintiff is unable to
meet the "compactness" prong of Gingles because the minority
population, while substantial, is too dispersed geographically to form
the core of a compact district. Properly interpreted, the plain
language of section 2, statutory history, case law, and underlying

policy considerations argue for the conclusion that compactness is not
a sine qua non when a non-district remedy is sought.73 I have
suggested previously that in such situations, the Gingles test should be
modified so as to substitute the "threshold of exclusion" 74 for
compactness, but the conventional section 2 analysis should be
retained in other respects. 75 For example, in the five-seat county
commission discussed above, the threshold of exclusion would be [1
1(1+5)] or roughly 17%. So if blacks make up 18% of the county's
voting age population, 76 the threshold of exclusion would be satisfied.
facts of the case and expressly disclaimed any intent to convey blanket denunciations of
alternative remedies. See Cane, 35 F.3d at 928; McGhee, 860 F.2d at 120. In the third such
case, the appellate court reversed on both liability and remedy grounds, broadly criticizing
cumulative voting in dicta. See Cousin v. Sundquist, 145 F.3d 818, 827 (6th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 1026 (1999). The most recent case has not yet been heard on appeal.
See McCoy v. Chicago Heights, 6 F. Supp. 2d 973 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
71. See Mulroy, supra note 8, at 356-62.
72. See id. at 368-70; supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
73. See Mulroy, supra note 8, at 363-68.
74. Because such a precondition should measure the minimum amount of minority
population necessary to establish a potential to elect a candidate of choice in a given
situation, I have argued that for limited voting, the value (i.e., the number of votes each
voter has) should equal one. See Mulroy, supra note 8, at 339-40. When this value equals
one, the threshold of exclusion formula for limited voting equals the formulae for
cumulative and preference voting, allowing only one formula to be used in the analysis.
See id. at 340-43.
75. See id. at 343-46. Although the legal theory described here would apply to
elections at all levels, I envision it being experimented with initially at the local level only.
This result would fit the pattern of the original "vote dilution" cases under the Voting
Rights Act and the cases to date that have dealt with alternative systems. See id. at 336
n.12. The theory would apply to minority vote dilution challenges to districting systems
that diluted minority voting strength as well as to challenges to traditional, "winner-takeall" at-large systems. See id. at 336 n.12, 337-38.
76. Courts generally use voting age population to determine whether section 2
plaintiffs have met the first Gingles precondition. See Solomon v. Liberty County, 899
F.2d 1012, 1018 (11th Cir. 1990) (en banc); McNeil v. Springfield Park Dist., 851 F.2d 937,
944-45 (7th Cir. 1988). But see Garza v. Los Angeles County, 918 F.2d 763, 774-76 (9th
Cir. 1990) (stating that the use of total population figures may be sufficient). A more
empirically accurate approach in evaluating the threshold of exclusion would involve the
use of voter turnout statistics. This approach, however, presents several disadvantages.
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Alternative remedies would be safe from the pitfalls of Shaw
because of their race-neutral nature. Although one could argue that
the use of these systems as section 2 remedies evidences a motive to
enhance racial or ethnic voting strength that would trigger strict
scrutiny under Shaw, such a view would constitute a misreading of the
Shaw line of cases. The heart of the Supreme Court's objection to
"racial gerrymanders" is that they are functionally equivalent to
"racial classifications," which trigger strict scrutiny.17 Because
alternative systems do not classify anyone, or in any way benefit racial
minorities differently from partisan or ideological minorities, they are
therefore by their nature outside the Shaw framework. 7 Moreover,
Shaw liability requires a showing of some objective feature which is
"subordinated" to race. 79 The mere motivation to enhance racial
fairness on the part of those adopting a remedial plan cannot by itself
establish heightened review if the remedy does not subordinate
traditional principles in some demonstrable way. If state and local
jurisdictions are free to draw race-conscious districts consistent with
traditional districting principles, 80 they surely are free to adopt raceSee Mulroy, supra note 8, at 375-77.
77. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642-45, 649-51, 657 (1993) (referring repeatedly to
the centrality of "classifications" as the rationale for the new Shaw cause of action).
78. See Cleveland County Ass'n for Gov't by the People v. Cleveland County Bd. of
Comm'rs, 965 F. Supp. 72, 80 (D.D.C. 1997) (upholding a limited voting scheme against a
Shaw challenge on this ground), rev'd on other grounds, 142 F.3d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
79. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915-16 (1995) (requiring a threshold showing
that "traditional race-neutral districting principles" were "subordinated" to race).
80. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 977 (1996) (plurality opinion) (affording states
some "leeway" to draw race-conscious districts). Arguably, the Court sent the opposite
signal in Miller, in which it indicated that strict scrutiny could be triggered under Shaw
through an examination of "legislative purpose," even absent a bizarrely shaped district.
See Miller, 515 U.S. at 913-15. But the Miller opinion also makes clear that to trigger strict
scrutiny, the challenged plan must "subordinateo traditional race-neutral districting
principles ... to race." Id. at 916. The Court resolved any uncertainty on this point in the
later decision, Bush, when seven of the nine Justices indicated that the intentional creation
of a minority district would not by itself necessarily trigger strict scrutiny. See Bush, 517
U.S. at 962 (plurality opinion); id, at 1003-04 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1051 n.5
(Souter, J., dissenting); see also Lawyer v. Department of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 580-81
(1997) (upholding a district court's refusal to apply strict scrutiny to a Florida senate
minority district that was clearly race-conscious in design because its characteristics were
in line with those of other house and senate districts in the state).
The language in Miller may simply stand for the narrow proposition that Shaw
plaintiffs need not make a threshold showing of bizarre shape before being able to
proceed with their claim-the precise context in which the language appears. See Miller,
515 U.S. at 914. Under this interpretation, a Shaw plaintiff could satisfy her prima facie
burden by showing that a challenged district subordinated some other districting principle
besides compactness, such as respect for political subdivision boundaries or considerations
of communities of interest. See id. at 915. Or it simply may be that the Court's view on
this matter has evolved over time.
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neutral alternative systems to accomplish the same end.
II. CHoosiNG BETWEEN SINGLE-MEMBER DIsTRIcrs AND
ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES

If alternative electoral systems are indeed available as remedies
in section 2 vote dilution cases, the following question immediately
presents itself: When should courts impose or section 2 plaintiffs seek
such alternative remedies instead of single-member districts?
One obvious choice is to use alternative remedies in those cases
when it is impossible to draw a single-member district, or impossible
to draw one in a manner consistent with Shaw and Miller. This
conclusion is particularly relevant for protected minority groups such
as Hispanics or Asians, who tend to be more geographically dispersed
in a jurisdiction than black voters, 81 and yet sufficiently numerous in
many jurisdictions to benefit from a "threshold of exclusion"
standard. A related situation occurs when concentrations of two
different minority groups in close proximity allow a compact district
to be drawn for either group but not both. This situation arises most
frequently in urban areas with heavy concentrations of both blacks

and Hispanics."' Alternative remedies would eliminate this dilemma.
Alternative remedies also should be used when it is legally
possible but impractical to use single-member districts. For example,
in very small jurisdictions, perhaps rural areas, drawing district
boundaries and employing multiple polling places may be
troublesome.' Such considerations, therefore, might apply to many
81. See Richard L. Engstrom, Minority Electoral Opportunities and Alternative
Electoral Systems in the United States, in VOTING RIGHTS AND REDISTRICrING IN THE
UNITED STATEs 227, 229 (Mark E. Rush ed., 1998) (referring to the relative residential
dispersion of Latinos).
1997) (three82. See King v. State Bd. of Elections, 979 F. Supp. 619,625 n.4 (N.D. Ill.
judge court) (explaining how the odd shape of a Hispanic district in Chicago was necessary
to "protect" neighboring black districts from "retrogression"), afftd, 118 S. Ct. 877 (1998);
Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1323 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (three-judge court) (describing
the need for a black district to extend tendrils winding through nearby Hispanic areas to
pick up black voters), affd sub nom. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (plurality opinion);
De Grandy v. Wetherell, 815 F. Supp. 1550, 1576 (N.D. Fla. 1992) (three-judge court)
(noting that the creation of a Hispanic state senate district in the Miami area would
sacrifice creation of a third black senate district), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom.
Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994).
83. Indeed, jurisdictions generally should see alternative systems as an attractive way
of saving the burden and expense of redistricting every 10 years after the release of the
Decennial Census. For those jurisdictions that must obtain advance "preclearance" of
voting changes pursuant to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the use of such systems
would save the additional burden of having to obtain "preclearance" of each decennial
redistricting. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the "preclearance" provision, applies,
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local jurisdictions in Native American areas.
A tougher question arises when both districts and alternative
schemes are feasible. Certainly, when compact districts are possible,
establishing liability is less problematic:
The first Gingles
precondition is satisfied, and there is no need to resort to using the
"threshold of exclusion" as a substitute for the compactness prong.
The remedy issue becomes more difficult, however, because both
traditional and non-traditional remedies are available. In such
circumstances, I believe a hierarchy of decisional rules should be
followed in choosing the remedy.
A. Defendant's Choice
The first rule should be "defendant's choice." This rule, which
borrows from well-established case law involving traditional
redistricting claims, mandates the remedy that intrudes least on the
province of the democratically elected governing body. After liability
is established, the defendant jurisdiction must be given the first
opportunity to fashion a remedial plan and present it to the court.84
The court must defer to the choice of the governing legislative body,
as long as that choice is consistent with federal statutes and the
Constitution.85 Thus, if the defendant jurisdiction chooses a singlemember district remedy, the court must scrutinize the remedy first to
see if it complies fully with the Voting Rights Act. Then, it must
determine if the district is consistent with such constitutional
requirements as "one-person, one-vote" and the strictures of Shaw
and Miller. If it meets these requirements, the court should adopt the
defendant-proposed districting plan, regardless of whether the
plaintiffs seek an alternative electoral system or whether the court
might deem an alternative electoral system better (for minorities or
otherwise) on policy grounds.
according to section 4 of the Act, to certain covered jurisdictions with a history of voting

discrimination. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, §§ 4-5, 79 Stat. 437,
438-39 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b, 1973c (1994)). Any change in voting
procedures must be affirmatively precleared as nondiscriminatory in purpose and effect,
either by the U.S. Attorney General or the District Court for the District of Columbia.

See id § 5, 79 Stat. at 439.
84. See, e.g., White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 794-95 (1973) (" '[J]udicial relief [in
reapportionment cases] becomes appropriate only when a legislature fails to reapportion
according to federal constitutional requisites in a timely fashion after having had an
adequate opportunity to do so.'" (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586 (1964)));
see also Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 41 (1982) (quoting this same language from
White).
85. See Upham, 456 U.S. at 40-41; Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 160-61 (1971).
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In evaluating compliance under the Voting Rights Act, courts
should examine whether a purportedly minority-opportunity district
presented by the defendant jurisdiction does in fact have sufficient

minority population to provide a reasonable opportunity for minority
voters to elect candidates of choice.86 Courts routinely make such
determinations in section 2 cases,87 and this type of remedial analysis
survives in the post-Shaw era.88
Similarly, courts should see whether the defendant's proffered

plan features a sufficient number of separate minority districts.
Depending on the statutorily protected minority group's percentage
of the jurisdiction's population, the overall strength of the plaintiff's
showing on the Gingles preconditions, and the Senate factors, a court
can determine if section 2 requires two or more minority-viable

districts.89 It is in this situation that an alternative electoral remedy
may often achieve section 2 compliance when a districting remedy

fails. Alternative systems often produce minority electoral victories
in rough proportion to the percentage of minority voters. Because
they are unencumbered by the demographic and Shaw constraints
affecting district remedies, these alternative systems may be able to
provide sufficient relief where district remedies cannot.9"
86. See, e.g., Harvell v. Blytheville Sch. Dist., 126 F.3d 1038, 1040 (8th Cir. 1997)
("The district court need not defer to a state-proposed remedial plan, however, if the plan
does not completely remedy the violation ..... (emphasis added)).
87. See, e.g., id. at 1039.
88. In Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997), the Supreme Court evaluated the
Georgia congressional districting plan approved by the lower court after the prior plan
was struck down on Shaw grounds. See id. at 93. The Court noted with approval the
district court's conclusion, after reviewing local racial bloc voting patterns, that a
traditionally black-majority district in the Atlanta area should be comprised of at least
55% black registered voters. See id.
89. See, e.g., Teague v. Attala County, 92 F.3d 283, 285, 294 (5th Cir. 1996) (reversing
a lower court ruling against the plaintiffs on the plaintiffs' claim that the number of blackmajority county commission districts should be raised from one to two). But see Johnson
v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1002, 1017-22 (1994) (reversing a lower court ruling that the
state should have created 11 instead of nine Hispanic-majority districts and noting that
"one may suspect vote dilution from political famine, but one is not entitled to suspect
(much less infer) dilution from mere failure to guarantee a political feast").
90. I do not mean to suggest that section 2 plaintiffs automatically are entitled to a
share of districts proportional to their share of the population. The Court in De Grandy
made clear that that is not the case. See De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1013-16. The Court,
however, also made clear that "proportionality," while not a floor, is also not a ceiling:
section 2 does not forbid remedial districting plans that achieve proportionality. See id. at
1016-18; infra 164-68 and accompanying text. I merely suggest that when a standard
section 2 analysis would otherwise indicate that plaintiffs were entitled to a reasonable
chance to fill, say, three seats with candidates of choice, but only one compact minority
district can be drawn, the court should look to alternative electoral systems rather than
accept a clearly insufficient districting remedy.
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For example, suppose that in our hypothetical county with a fivemember commission, Hispanics make up 35% of the voting age

population ("VAP"), but only one compact Hispanic-majority district
can be drawn. A threshold of exclusion analysis would suggest that

politically cohesive Hispanic voters could elect two candidates of
choice under an alternative system because the Hispanic VAP
91
exceeds 34% (2 x 17%).

If the defendant fails to respond with a legally acceptable
remedy, the responsibility falls on the district court to choose or
devise a remedial plan. 92 In so doing, however, the court must still
defer as much as possible to the defendant jurisdiction's stated
policies and preferences as expressed in statutory provisions or in
prior electoral plans. 93 The court must not "intrude upon [the
'
jurisdiction's] stated policy any more than necessary."94
One district court tried to implement this solution in Cane v.
Worcester County.95 At the remedy phase of the litigation, the
defendant proposed a traditional at-large plan that was virtually
identical to the plan found to violate section 2, and the court rejected
the plan as inadequate.96 The county expressed no preference as

between a district plan and a cumulative voting plan.97 The court then
reviewed legislative statements expressing a policy preference for a
traditional at-large system and, on that basis, ordered cumulative
voting as a remedy because such a remedy retained the at-large

91. Generally, a cohesive share of the electorate that is X times the threshold of
exclusion will elect X candidates of choice. If a minority bloc is twice the threshold, it can
elect two candidates; if it is three times the threshold, it can elect three candidates; and so
on. See

CENTER FOR VOTING AND DEMOCRACY, PROPORTIONAL VOTING SYSTEMS:
THRESHOLDS OF REPRESENTATION To WIN ONE/MORE SEATS 1, 1 (1998) (on file with

North CarolinaLaw Review).

92. See Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 39 (1982) (stating that a court should not
defer to a legislature's judgment if the legislature's preferred plan violates federal law);
Westwego Citizens for Better Gov't v. City of Westwego, 946 F.2d 1109, 1124 (5th Cir.
1991) (ordering the elimination of an at-large electoral scheme in favor of a districting
system); Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City of Gretna, 834 F.2d 496, 504 (5th Cir. 1987)
(approving a district court order invalidating an at-large electoral scheme and replacing it
with a single-member district system); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Midland
Indep. Sch. Dist., 812 F.2d 1494, 1503 (5th Cir. 1987) (same).
93. See Upham, 456 U.S. at 41-42; White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783,794-95 (1973).
94. White, 412 U.S. at 794-95 (citing Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 160 (1971)).
This rule of deference may require courts to search through the local jurisdiction's
ordinances, resolutions, and other expressions of official positions regarding electoral
systems to attempt to divine a clear preference.
95. 847 F. Supp. 369 (D. Md.), affd in part,rev'd in part,35 F.3d 921 (4th Cir. 1994).
96. See idat 371-72.
97. See id. at 371.
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The Fourth Circuit reversed because it

disagreed with the district court's divination of the county's
preferences, concluding that the county would prefer a singlemember district plan.99 Significantly, the Fourth Circuit did not hold
that cumulative voting could never be a remedy.
The "defendant's choice" rule may also fail to provide a clear
remedial solution in other situations, such as when defendants differ

among themselves as to the proper remedy.'
Another example
occurs when the defendant's preferred remedy initially appeared to
repair fully the underlying vote dilution, but flaws in the remedy
appeared upon implementation.' 0 '
B. State Law Considerations
A corollary to the "defendant's choice" rule is the notion that

when choosing between two or more remedies, all of which satisfy the
Voting Rights Act and the Constitution, the court should choose the
plan that does the least violence to state as well as local election

requirements. The need for maximum consistency with state law is
always part of a district court's remedial calculus in standard voting
cases.'" Thus, even when there is no way to ascertain the defendant
98. See id. at 374.
99. See Cane, 35 F.3d at 928. For another example of a district court interpretation of
a defendant jurisdiction's silence on the question of remedy, see infraPart I.B (discussing
Cousin v. McWherter, 904 F. Supp. 686 (E.D. Tenn. 1995), rev'd and vacated sub nom.
Cousin v. Sundquist, 145 F.3d 818 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1026 (1999)).
100. See McCoy v. Chicago Heights, 6 F. Supp. 2d 973, 978 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (noting that
City and Park Districts proposed different districting plans).
101. See id. at 979-81 (noting that the record showed that under a consent decree
remedy, ties along racial lines among six councilmembers were frequent and that the white
mayor elected at-large always voted with the white councilmembers to break the tie).
102 See Cleveland County Ass'n for Gov't by the People v. Cleveland County Bd. of
Comm'rs, 142 F.3d 468, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (setting aside a voting rights consent decree
on the grounds that its terms conflicted with state law, it was not approved or passed by
the state legislature, and it was not strictly necessary to remedy a finding of liability
regarding the deprivation of a federal statutory or constitutional right); Perkins v. City of
Chicago Heights, 47 F.3d 212, 218 (7th Cir. 1995) (same); League of United Latin Am.
Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 846-48 (5th Cir. 1993) (en bane)
(same); Brooks v. State Bd. of Elections, 848 F. Supp. 1548, 1563-66 (S.D. Ga. 1994)
(same). But see Lawyer v. Department of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 578-79 (1997) (approving
a statewide redistricting settlement that was not passed by the state legislature on the
ground that, inter alia, the state attorney general had the authority under state law to
enter into such a consent decree); Armstrong v. Adams, 869 F.2d 410, 414 (8th Cir. 1989)
("Any limitation of power imposed by state law on the Board of Election Commissioners
is vitiated by the authority of the district court to remedy constitutional violations that
may have occurred during the election."). The cases are somewhat mixed on the exact
extent of courts' authority under the Supremacy Clause to impose or approve vote
dilution remedies that may conflict with state law. Courts differ as to whether an
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jurisdiction's preference regarding electoral remedies, state law
restrictions on electoral systems may still provide guidance.
The concern for harmony with state law motivated the appellate
court to set aside the limited voting consent decree in Cleveland
County Ass'n for Government by the People v. Cleveland County.13
In that case, the D.C. Circuit noted that North Carolina law provided
that several electoral changes brought about by the Voting Rights Act
consent decree at issue-an increase in the number of county
commissioners, a change from a traditional at-large system to a
limited voting system, and the temporary appointment of two
commissioners who would be "representative of the black
community"-could be effected only by a countywide referendum or
an act of the state legislature." 4 The court reasoned that because this
procedure was not followed, the district court needed either a finding
or an admission of Voting Rights Act liability before approving the
decree. 05
Notably, the court's opinion did not constitute an attack on the
viability of limited voting or other alternative voting schemes as
Voting Rights Act remedies. In fact, the court expressly stated:
We do not hold today that the limited voting scheme
provided for in the consent decree is itself contrary to the
"public policy" or even the law of North Carolina-indeed
...

it has been successfully implemented in several other

jurisdictions in the state.... Rather, the consent decree fails
because state law prevents the Board from unilaterally
agreeing to any change in its structure or method of
election."0 6
admission or finding of liability is required, which public officials are empowered to enter
into such settlements, and other details. See, e.g., infra note 98. Nonetheless, it is clear
that courts make a serious effort to avoid conflicting with state law whenever possible.
103. 142 F.3d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
104. Id. at 475-76.

105. See id. at 477-78 & n.18 (rejecting a contrary holding in Armstrong, 869 F.2d at
414). In stating this broad rule requiring either an adjudication or admission of liability on
the underlying federal claim before a court can approve a consent decree inconsistent with
state law, the Cleveland County appellate panel arguably misread the Supreme Court's
opinion in Lawyer. In Lawyer, the State of Florida adopted a new redistricting plan
through a consent decree without an admission or adjudication of liability, contrary to
state law. The Court rejected arguments that such an admission or adjudication was
necessary. See Lawyer, 521 U.S. at 575-80. The Cleveland County court distinguished
Lawyer on the ground that the State had authority under state law to alter its own
redistricting plan, whereas a county, as a subordinate government unit, could not act in a
manner inconsistent with state law absent an adjudication or admission of a federal law
violation. See Cleveland County, 142 F.3d at 476 n.15.
106. Cleveland County, 142 F.3d at 478.
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In Cousin v. Sundquist,1 7 Tennessee state law considerations
pointed away from district remedies and toward alternative remedies.

In response to the court's liability ruling, 08 the state legislature
initially passed legislation providing for the election of county judicial
posts through single-member districts, or in the alternative, by limited
or cumulative voting. 9 The state attorney general issued an opinion
concluding that a districting scheme would violate the state

constitution, which required that the judges be elected from the same
geographic area over which they exercised jurisdiction." 0

The

attorney general's opinion was silent on the question of limited or
cumulative voting."'

In response, the Tennessee House of

Representatives incorporated an amendment to the proposed
legislation establishing cumulative voting that would be effective two
years from the date of enactment, but the proposed legislation did not
pass the House." In its pleadings, the State took no formal position
on remedy."

The court considered these actions to be indicia of

state policy, and it also discussed policy considerations for and against
cumulative voting over district remedies before deciding to adopt a

cumulative voting remedy."4 This remedial judgment seems correct,
particularly in light of the state's unicameral endorsement of a
cumulative voting solution.
The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, however, criticizing

the district court's opinion on a number of distinct grounds." 5
Although the appellate court could have disposed of the entire case
through its ruling that section 2 had not been violated, the court

criticized both single-member districts and cumulative voting as
remedies, particularly in judicial election cases." 6
107. No. 1:90-CV-339 (E.D. Tenn. July 3, 1996), rev'd and vacated, 145 F.3d 818 (6th
Cir. 1998), and cerL denied, 119 S. Ct. 1026 (1999).
108. See Cousin v. McWherter, 904 F. Supp. 686, 713-14 (E.D. Tenn. 1995), rev'd and
vacated sub nor. Cousin v. Sundquist, 145 F.3d 818 (6th Cir. 1998), and cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 1026 (1999). The Sixth Circuit reversed on both liability and remedy in Sundquist,
vacating both the reported liability decision McWherther and the unreported remedy
decision Sundquist. See Sundquist,145 F.3d at 818.
109. See Sundquist,No. 1:90-CV-339, slip op. at 2-4.
110. See Op. Tenn. Att'y Gen. No. 96-023 (Feb. 22, 1996), at 1-2.
111. See Sundquist, No. 1:90-CV-339, slip op. at 4. The Attorney General opinion
relied on article IV, sections 4 and 5 of the Tennessee Constitution. See Op. Tenn. Att'y
Gen. No. 96-023, at 3.
112. See Sundquist,No. 1:90-CV-339, slip op. at 4-7.
113. See id. slip op. at 7.
114. See id. slip op. at 8-13.
115. See Cousin v. Sundquist, 145 F.3d 818, 828-31 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 1026 (1999).
116. See iL at 829-31.
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Finally, the court in McCoy v. Chicago Heights" 7 adopted a
cumulative voting remedy while emphasizing that Illinois law
explicitly authorized cumulative voting as a local electoral method. 118
Citing its responsibility to avoid "'intrud[ing] upon state policy any
more than necessary,' "119 the court also emphasized the long history
of cumulative voting in Illinois, including its use in electing state
legislators from 1870 to 1980.120
To keep the number of
councilmembers the same as under the existing system (and perhaps
to ensure a sufficiently low threshold of exclusion), the court ordered
seven-member cumulative voting elections, even though the relevant
Illinois statute specifically authorized three-member cumulative
voting elections.'
Interestingly, this remedial order modified a
consent decree that mandated seven single-member districts, a plan
that itself constituted a slight
deviation from what was explicitly
22
authorized under Illinois law.
Overall, the case law establishes that when a defendant
jurisdiction does not present the district court with a remedial
proposal adequate under the Voting Rights Act, the court has broad
discretion to provide a full and complete remedy to the underlying
violation." Therefore, when the defendant jurisdiction's preference
cannot be discerned with confidence and state law considerations do
not dictate the outcome, a court may use policy considerations to
inform its choice of competing remedies. Some useful policy
considerations are discussed below.
C. GeneralPreferabilityof Alternative Schemes
I recommend a general policy preference for alternative electoral
schemes over district remedies. Alternative electoral methods
possess the following virtues which commend their use: the ability to
117. 6 F. Supp. 2d 973 (N.D. Ill.
1998).
118. See id. at 984-85.
119. Id. at 984 (quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 160 (1971)).
120. See id. For a discussion of how Illinois ended its statewide use of cumulative
voting in 1980, see infra note 212.
121. See ChicagoHeights, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 985.
122. See id. at 976.

123. See Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965) (discussing the breadth
and flexibility of a federal court's equitable discretion regarding remedies). Federal courts
are empowered and required to do whatever is necessary to cure voting rights violations.
See id.; see also S. REP.No. 97-417, at 31 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 208
("The court should exercise its traditional equitable powers to fashion the relief so that it

completely remedies the prior dilution of minority voting strength and fully provides equal
opportunity for minority citizens to participate and to elect candidates of their choice."
(emphasis added)).

1999]

ALTERNATIVE ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

1891

remedy minority vote dilution without running afoul of Shaw; the
promotion of ideological, partisan, and gender diversity as well as
racial and ethnic diversity; a more accurate reflection of the popular
will; and enhanced competitiveness, which in turn will lead to
enhanced voter turnout. More fundamentally, alternative methods
provide voters with "actual" rather than "virtual" representation and
avoid the risk of sacrificing "substantive" representation for
"descriptive" representation.
1. Diversity, Proportionality, Competition, and Turnout
Limited, cumulative, and preference voting all substantially
enhance the ability of cohesive racial and ethnic minorities to elect
preferred candidates.
Limited Voting
Some good examples of limited voting elections can be found in
Alabama as a result of a section 2 challenge to at-large election
schemes in nine Alabama counties. 24 In the fourteen municipalities
in which black candidates ran, black candidates won in thirteen; the
sole losing black candidate lost by only a single vote.125 These black
candidate victories were the first ever in ten of the thirteen
municipalities. 26 Limited vote elections held at the local level in
North Carolina and Georgia yielded similar results. 27
a.

Cumulative Voting
The track record of the first cumulative voting elections held
(pursuant to settlements) in the late 1980s and early 1990s is equally
as impressive as limited voting from the standpoint of racial and
ethnic minority empowerment. Whenever racial or ethnic minority
candidates ran, cumulative voting resulted in the election of racial or2s
ethnic minority candidates for the first time in decades (or ever).
This result occurred in various areas of the country and for various
b.

124. See Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 748 F. Supp. 819, 824 n.9 (M.D. Ala. 1990); see
also Dillard v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ., 686 F. Supp. 1459, 1461-62 (M.D. Ala. 1988)
(tracing the history of the Dillardlitigation).
125. See Engstrom, supra note 47, at 758-59. In seven of the 14 municipalities, the
black candidates ran uncontested. See id. at 758.
126. See id. at 759.
127. See id.; see also Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic
Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 227-30
(1989) (describing minority candidate victories in the first round of limited voting elections
in local jurisdictions in North Carolina and Alabama).
128. See Engstrom, supranote 47, at 752-57.
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statutorily protected minority groups:
Peoria, Illinois (black
candidate); Alamogordo, New Mexico (Hispanic candidate); Sisseton,
South Dakota (Native American candidates); and local jurisdictions
in Alabama (black candidates). 129 Moreover, analysis of the electoral
returns and exit surveys indicated that racial and ethnic minority
voters "plumped" their votes behind one candidate at a higher rate
than other voters and that this strategic voting-allowable only under
a cumulative voting system-was instrumental to the minority
candidates' victories. 30
Even more striking are the results of a study done on the use of
cumulative voting in local jurisdictions in Texas. In fourteen electoral
contests pitting a white candidate against a Hispanic candidate
preferred by Hispanic voters, the Hispanic candidates won eight and
lost six.' 3 ' In all six losses, the Hispanic share of the electorate was
well below the threshold of exclusion. 132 In seven of the eight
Hispanic candidate victories, Hispanic voters were above or near the
threshold of exclusion. 33 This study not only suggests that cumulative
voting can help significantly racial and ethnic minority voters, but also
that the threshold of exclusion is an accurate predictor of their ability
to elect their candidates of choice. Further, when the threshold does
err, it tends to err on the side of conservatism in predicting minority
voters' ability to elect preferred candidates. This finding probably
can be explained by minority voters' tendency to vote strategically at
a greater rate than whites.
Concerns have been raised that cumulative voting will not yield
greater minority representation in areas where minority voters are
insufficiently sophisticated or insufficiently politically mobilized to
use their votes strategically. For example, the U.S. Department of
129. See id. This record of minority electoral success has continued to the present day.
See, e.g., Brischetto & Engstrom, supra note 54, at 974 (describing the adoption and use of
cumulative voting by at least 15 municipalities and 32 school boards in Texas since 1991);
Engstrom et al., supra note 54, at 185 (describing Alabama's use of cumulative voting in
four municipalities plus the county commission and school board of another county since
1988); Engstrom et al., supra note 6, at 297-301 (describing the 1992 elections for county
commissioners in Chilton County, Alabama).
130. See Engstrom, supra note 47, at 753-55. For a more detailed discussion of the
evidence linking the ability to "plump" with racial and ethnic minority candidates'
victories, see Richard L. Engstrom et al., Cumulative Voting as a Remedy for Minority
Vote Dilution: The Case of Alamogordo, New Mexico, 5 J.L. & POL. 469, 489-95 (1989),
and Richard L. Engstrom & Charles J. Barrilleaux, Native Americans and Cumulative
Voting: The Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux, 72 Soc. Sci. Q. 388,391-92 (1991).
131. See Brischetto & Engstrom, supra note 54, at 982-83.
132- See id. at 985.
133. See id. at 984.
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Justice has denied administrative "preclearance" not only for
cumulative voting plans, but also for more mundane new voting
systems" when local authorities failed to explain adequately the new
system to affected voters. 135 The Department has made clear,
however, that this impediment is correctable with reasonable
publicity and a voter education program. 36
c. Preference Voting
Preference voting elections also increase the election of
candidates preferred by racial and ethnic minorities. For example,
after the first preference vote election for New York City community
school boards in 1970, the percentage of black and Hispanic
community school board members jumped to levels close to the
corresponding black and Hispanic percentages of the citywide
population. 37
These percentages increased with the rising
populations of blacks and Hispanics throughout the following
decades. The use of preference voting resulted in much more
proportional results than in the single-member district city council
elections held during this period, despite the presence of a number of
minority-oriented single-member districts in the city council
districting plan. 38
These electoral results strongly suggest that alternative systems
may play a useful role in countering vote dilution of racial and ethnic
groups protected under the Voting Rights Act. Such systems also
promote diversity in ways consistent with the inclusive spirit of the
Act. For example, alternative systems tend to improve electoral
chances for female candidates,' 39 at least as compared to singlemember district systems. 4° In Germany, which has a mixture of
proportional representation and plurality-vote, single-member district
elections, female candidates consistently perform better in the
proportional representation races.' 41 A recent study of U.S.
municipal and state legislative elections supports this conclusion by
134. For example, the use of more complicated voting machines.
135. See Steven J. Mulroy, Limited, Cumulative Evidence: DiviningJustice Department
Positions on Alternative Electoral Schemes, 84 NAT'L CIVIC REv. 66, 67-68 (1995); supra
note 83.
136. See Mulroy, supra note 135, at 67-68.
137. See AMY, supra note 48, at 138.
138. See id
139. See Engstrom et al., supra note 6, at 293-94.
140. See AMY, supra note 48, at 99-113. The Voting Rights Act does not forbid
discrimination on the basis of gender.
141. See iL at 106-07.

1894

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

suggesting that multimember elections afford a better opportunity for
female candidates than do single-member elections. 142
Proponents of these systems also tout other advantages reflecting
"good government."

Mathematically, the elections tend to lead to

results that more accurately reflect the entire electorate's preferences;
indeed, they are designed to do precisely that. Because a lower
threshold of exclusion allows less well-known candidates and parties
to have a realistic chance of taking a seat, and because these systems
also tend to prevent dominant groups from sweeping elections,
electoral contests held under these systems tend be more competitive
and to offer voters more choices.4 The extra competition and choice
lead to higher participation rates. 144
The higher voter turnout rate expected from alternative electoral

systems constitutes an independent reason for supporting their use, a
particularly compelling one in light of the abysmal turnout rates
currently exhibited in U.S. elections. 4 Much of the evidence for
higher turnout comes from studies using similar proportional
representation systems in other countries. One study has shown that
turnout rates in Western industrialized democracies using
proportional representation systems tend to be roughly ten
percentage points higher on average than in countries using the
142. See R. DARCY ET AL., WOMEN, ELECrIONS, & REPRESENTATION 159-68 (2d ed.
1994). This result may occur because parties are more willing to nominate female
candidates-to achieve gender balance or for other reasons-in multi-seat races. The
nomination all-male slates of candidates may seem odd when three or more candidates are
nominated in one multimember race. It may also be that voters are more willing to vote
for one female candidate when they can also vote for one or more male candidates; when
voters must select only one person, they may be more guided by the traditional American
preference for male political leaders.
The "gender dimension" to the proportional representation debate has generated
some recent attention in the popular media. See, e.g., Wilma Rule et al., Voting for a
Change,Ms., Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 26.
143. See AMY, supranote 48, at 76-98 (citing additional sources).
144. See id. at 144-48 (citing additional sources). In winner-take-all elections, a 10%
increase in voter turnout may mean only the difference between a narrow victory and a
landslide for a majority party or voting bloc (or the difference between an honorable loss
and a blowout for a minority party or bloc), with no actual difference in power after
election day. In alternative elections, such a turnout increase may translate into 10%
more power for a majority or minority group. Thus, political parties, minority groups, and
other organized voters have a great incentive to increase get-out-the-vote efforts.
145. See id. at 140-43 (contrasting the U.S. election turnout rate of 50% in the 1988
presidential election with the rates in most other Western democracies, which usually
experience roughly 70%-80% turnout); Arend Lijphart, Unequal Participation:
Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma, 91 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1, 5 (1997) (summarizing
empirical research that makes a similar contrast and noting an average U.S. off-year
turnout rate of 35% and a local election turnout rate of 25% in recent years).
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traditional, winner-take-all electoral method.'4 6 If the "outlier" result

of New Zealand-with a turnout rate twelve percentage points higher
than any other winner-take-all country-is excluded, the turnout

advantage rises to fifteen percentage points. 147 Recent comparative
studies that control for other factors arguably affecting turnout have

estimated that using these systems boosts turnout somewhere
between 9% and 12%."48
2. "Actual" Rather than "Virtual" Representation
In any districting scheme, with or without minority districts,

some voters will always be "left out." That is, there will always be
Democrats in Republican districts, blacks in white districts,
conservatives in liberal districts, and so forth. It is impossible to
design a districting system in which every individual is satisfied with
where she is placed.
Instead, voters must rely on "virtual
representation"a---the notion that as long as groups have fairly
apportioned control over districts, the effective disenfranchisement

of, say, individual Hispanics stuck in an overwhelmingly Anglo
district does not matter.'

In theory, such Hispanic voters will be

"virtually represented" by the Hispanic-preferred candidates in other
Hispanic-majority districts throughout the jurisdiction. Courts have
recognized this phenomenon and have correctly considered virtual
5
representation an acceptable part of districting.' '

146. See AMY, supra note 48, at 140-41.
147. See id
148. See Lijphart, supra note 145, at 7. Lijphart cites four recent studies: Andre Blais
& R.K. Carty, Does ProportionalRepresentationFoster Voter Turnout?, 18 EUR. J. POL.
RES. 167, 174 (1990); Walter Dean Burnham, The Turnout Problem, in ELECrIONS
AMERICAN STYLE 97, 106-07 (A. James Reichley ed., 1987); Mark N. Franklin, Electoral
Participation,in COMPARING DEMOCRACIES: ELECrIONS AND VOTING IN GLOBAL
PERSPECrVE 216, 226 (Laurence LeDuc et al. eds., 1996); Arend Lijphart, Democracies:
Forms,Performance,and ConstitutionalEngineering,25 EUR. J. POL. RES. 1, 5-7 (1994).
149. See Note, supra note 52, at 147 n.120 (discussing the origin of the term).
150. Some commentators have referred to those persons forced to rely on virtual
representation as "filler people." See, e.g., Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 6, at 63031. The term reflects the reality that persons drawing districting plans will create, say, a
"safe" Democratic district, but, lest Democratic strength be wasted by unduly "packing" a
district with Democratic voters, the district will be drawn to include a 40% or so
complement of Republicans as "filler." The process is reversed when drawing districts
designed to be "safe" for Republicans. As another example, whites may be used as "filler
people" when drawing minority-majority districts. See id at 633. This practice, inherent
in any districting system, does not occur within alternative systems.
151. See, e.g., Gomez v. City of Watsonville, 863 F.2d 1407, 1414 (9th Cir. 1988)
(approving a remedial districting plan in which approximately 60% of the city's Hispanics
would live outside the two Hispanic remedial districts); Campos v. City of Baytown, 840
F.2d 1240, 1244 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986), and
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Virtual representation, however, is not truly necessary. Voters in
alternative systems have the opportunity to "self-district." They may,
in effect, place themselves in whichever "district" they want by
casting their votes on whatever racial, ethnic, partisan, gender, or
ideological basis they choose. These systems are designed to
minimize the number of "wasted" votes 52 by reducing voter
frustration caused by the inability to elect any candidates of choice.
As an empirical matter, almost all voters are able to point to at least
one incumbent and say, "I voted for that person." 153 'In this way,
these systems promote actual representation and do not rely on
virtual representation.
Similarly, alternative systems provide more opportunities for
gradations of difference. "Virtual representation" means not only
that Democrats in a Republican district have to "feel represented" by
a Democrat elsewhere, but also that many liberal Democrats will
have to feel represented by a moderate Democrat and vice versa,
creating even more dimensions in which voters in traditional systems
feel unrepresented.
For example, the Georgia congressional
delegation currently consists of eight conservative white Republicans
and three liberal black Democrats. 4 Undoubtedly, many moderate
white voters of both parties do not feel represented by anyone in the
delegation. By fostering a wider, more evenly spaced ideological
distribution in the set of elected legislators, alternative systems
ameliorate this additional sense of disenfranchisement.

noting that the fact that some members of a protected minority group live outside the
minority district does not defeat a section 2 claim).
152. See AMY, supra note 48, at 24-26.

153. See Engstrom, supra note 47, at 762. In preference voting, the percentage of
ballots cast for at least some winning candidates rises with the number of seats to be filled:
at least 5/6 for an election to fill five seats, for example. See Edward Still & Robert Richie,
Alternative Electoral Systems as Voting Rights Remedies, 1997 FED. ELECTIONS COMM'N
J. ELECTIONS ADMIN.18, 22. In practice, the percentage can be higher: One study of
preference voting in Cambridge, Massachusetts showed that 96% of the electorate voted
for at least one winning candidate, with 80% seeing their first or second choice elected.
See AMY, supra note 48, at 26. An empirical study of limited and cumulative voting
elections in Alabama found that at least 73% of the voters in limited voting and at least
61% of the voters in cumulative voting jurisdictions have voted for winning candidates.
See Edward Still, Cumulative Voting and Limited Voting in Alabama, in UNITED STATES
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS: THEIR IMPACT ON WOMEN AND MINORITIES 183, 191 (Wilma

Rule & Joseph F. Zimmerman eds., 1992). These results contrast with winner-take-all
systems when, in close two-candidate races, the percentage voting for a winning candidate
can be as low as 51%, and in plurality elections even smaller.
154. See Jeffrey Rosen, Southern Comfort, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 8-15, 1996, at 4, 4
(indicating that after the 1996 election, the Georgia congressional delegation consisted of
eight white Republicans and three black Democrats).
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These differences in alternative systems have both practical and
psychological advantages. As a practical matter, electoral results tend
to mirror more closely popular preference. Equally important is the
psychological benefit. With more voters feeling as though they have
at least one representative to call "their own," satisfaction with the
electoral system rises while cynicism and apathy fall. Because each
voter feels as though she has less of a chance of suffering a "shutout"
at the polls, voter participation increases.
3. Elimination of Any Conflict Between "Descriptive" and

.j.

"Substantive" Representation
Another advantage of alternative systems is that they avoid a
tradeoff, or the perception of a tradeoff, between the election of
candidates of choice on the one hand and overall influence on
legislative outcomes on the other. Some critics of majority-minority
districts argue that such districts actually reduce minority voters'
ability to influence legislative outcomes by lowering the total number
of representatives elected from all districts who are responsive to
minority voters' concerns 55 Drawing black-majority districts, for
example, "bleaches" neighboring districts, making them more
conservative and Republican, resulting in an overall legislative
delegation that votes less favorably from black voters' perspective on
issues. 6 One commonly cited example is the 1990s congressional
redistricting in Georgia, which went from having nine Democratic
representatives (one of whom was black) and one Republican
representative (white) to only three Democratic representatives (all
black) and eight Republican representatives (all white). 5 7 As a
result, black voters may have improved their "descriptive
representation" (that is, the extent to which they are represented by
candidates of choice), but only at the expense of their "substantive
representation" (that is, the extent to which their substantive
preferences on the issues are reflected in legislative policy
155. See Michael Kelly, Segregation Anxiety, NEW YORKER, Nov. 20, 1995, at 43, 48,
53; Rosen, supra note 154, at 49.
156. The liberal, Democratic voting tendencies of black voters are well documented.
See, e.g., DAvID LUBLIN, THE PARADOX OF REPRESENTATION:
RAcIAL
GERRYMANDERING AND MINORITY INTERESTS IN CONGRESS 57-59,73-78 (1997).
157. See Rosen, supra note 154, at 4.
But see Laughlin McDonald, The
Counterrevolution in Minority Voting Rights, 65 MIss. L.J. 271, 295-96 & n.113 (1995)
(describing this argument but arguing that the causal link between minority districts and
Democratic losses is exaggerated, and using Georgia as an example of how the trade-offs
"between creating majority black districts and electing more Democrats" can often be
"minimized").
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outcomes).158

While this point has some merit, it can easily be overstated. For
example, the "bleaching" effect has been credited (or blamed) for the
Democrats' loss of the U.S. House of Representatives in 1994.159
Most studies, however, show that the drawing of minority-majority
districts played only a small role in that loss and that the actual
number of Democratic seats lost due to minority-majority districts
was smaller than generally supposed. 160
Moreover, this "tradeoff" between descriptive and substantive
representation1 6' may result more from inartful district drawing than
from an inherent flaw in race-conscious districting. A recent
empirical study of congressional elections indicated that for minority
voters, such a tradeoff occurs only in the South and only where the
drawing of majority-minority districts reduces the total number of
districts in the state that are more than 40% black in population
(largely because such districting reduces the total number of
Democrats). 62 Because districts around 40% in minority population
frequently can elect minority voters' candidates of choice, 163 it might
often be possible to draw districts that elect candidates of choice
158. See LUBLIN, supra note 156, at 36-37, 57-97.
159. See, e.g., Kelly, supranote 155, at 46; Rosen, supra note 154, at 4.
160. See LUBLIN, supra note 156, at 123 (noting that new majority-minority districts
cost Democrats only nine seats in 1992 and 1994, compared to 54 total seats lost in 1994
when the Democrats lost control of the House of Representatives); David A. Bositis, The
Future of Majority-MinorityDistricts and Black andHispanicLegislative Representation,in
REDISTRICTING AND MINORITY REPRESENTATION 9, 19 (David A. Bositis ed., 1998)
(estimating that minority districting cost eight to 13 Democratic seats); see also Allan J.
Lichtman, QuotasAren't the Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1994, at A23 (finding that equally
significant Democratic losses in non-district, at-large races and an overall decline in
Democratic support were more important reasons for the Democrats's loss of control of
the House of Representatives).
161. Choosing between such representative goals is not as easy as it may first appear.
Although maximizing the number of times the legislature votes the way a minority group
prefers would seem to be a universal priority, minority voters might be willing to settle for
a slightly lower batting average at the end of a legislative session if they know they have a
representative who can be counted on to vote the right way (or vigorously advocate the
right approach) on a few core issues. Alternatively, minority voters might place a high
value on having an incumbent who shares their background and thus is viewed as
accessible to pleas for constituent service.
162. See LUBLIN, supra note 156, at 89-90, 92-93, 99-102. Lublin conducted statistical
regression analyses of more than 5000 congressional elections between 1972 and 1994. In
3800 of them, he compared district characteristics to the voting records of the
representatives elected, scored along an ideological scale developed previously by other
political scientists. See id. at 41, 68, 82, 89-90, 92-93.
163. See Allan J. Lichtman & J. Gerald Hebert, A General Theory of Vote Dilution, 6
LA RAZA L.J. 1, 11-16 (1993) (explaining how minority districts below 50% in minority
population may still elect minority candidates of choice).
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without unduly diminishing the influence of those voters on
legislative outcomes. Thus, the districting dilemma for minority
voters, while real, is not as common as one might think and may often
be avoidable with more informed plan-drawing.
Whether this tradeoff is real or imagined, common or rare,
avoidable or inevitable, it applies only to district remedies.
Alternative remedies allow minority groups to elect a number of
representatives proportional to their share of the electorate while
simultaneously permitting and encouraging coalitions with other-race
candidates who share their views. The ability of alternative remedies
to avoid the dilemma described above is a strong argument in their
favor.
4. Criticisms of Alternative Systems
As a preliminary matter, one threshold legal argument against
the use of alternative systems must be addressed. Alternative systems
have been criticized precisely because they are designed to achieve or
approximate "proportional representation," a result that is arguably
forbidden by the language of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act."6
This criticism refers to the "proviso" of section 2, which states that
"nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a
protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the
population."'65 This language has been interpreted to mean that
minority groups are not entitled to "proportional
statutorily protected
' 66
representation.'
The section 2 proviso does not refer to "proportionality" in the
political science sense of classifying electoral systems. Instead, the
proviso's language merely links the success rate of minority
candidates to the minority group's share of the population. 67 Thus, if
blacks make up 40% of a jurisdiction's population, the section 2
proviso makes clear that a consistent failure by black candidates to
win 40% of the governing body's seats would not, by itself, constitute
a section 2 violation. Instead, plaintiffs still would have to proveregardless of whether they seek district or "alternative" relief-racial
bloc voting, historical discrimination, socioeconomic disadvantage,
164. See, e.g., Cousin v. Sundquist, 145 F.3d 818,829-30 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119
S. Ct. 1026 (1999). This argument is discussed in Mulroy, supra note 8, at 373-74.
165. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)) (amending section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
166. See, e.g., McGhee v. Granville County, 860 F.2d 110, 116-17,120 (4th Cir. 1988).
167. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1014 n.11 (1994) (explaining the proviso
in this manner).
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If they make this

showing, however, the fact that their relief would enable them to

approach, equal, or even exceed "proportionality" would not be fatal
to their claim. This result is entirely consistent with the section 2
proviso and the Voting Rights Act as a whole."6
Another, more fundamental policy argument against alternative
systems is that they do away with the geographic basis of
representation. This argument is based on two assumptions: First,
geography is a useful proxy for a community of interest on the part of

voters; second, geography is a better proxy than the self-selected
preferences of voters themselves, whether these preferences derive
from racial identity, partisan affiliation, ideological leanings, or any
other basis. As an empirical matter, I believe the first proposition is
becoming increasingly dubious in the era of the Internet,
telecommuting, and "narrowcasting"' 69 as physical location becomes a
less determinative factor in one's modem life. I consider the second
proposition to be almost self-evidently false. Voters in a particular
neighborhood may indeed have common issues regarding traffic,
garbage pick-up, or opposition to the siting of a hazardous waste
dump. Many neighbors, however, may be dissimilar in their political
or issue-based outlooks. The "self-districting" of alternative systems
allows voters to align themselves with their neighbors if
neighborhood issues are important to them, while simultaneously
allowing them to unite with like-minded individuals across town as
well.
Alternative systems thus enhance, rather than replace,
geography-based interests as a possible basis for voting.7 0
Critics also contend that regardless of the alleged advantages

above, alternative systems are unsatisfactory because they make
16& See id. at 1017-18 (holding that proportionality is not a "safe harbor" for
defendant jurisdictions and that such a result is consistent with the section 2 proviso); see
also id. at 1025 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that representation lower than a
proportional share of a minority group's population is "always relevant" and is "probative
evidence of vote dilution" (emphasis added)). This result is consistent with lower court
decisions facing this issue. See, e.g., Williams v. City of Texarkana, 861 F. Supp. 756, 764
(W.D. Ark. 1992) ("[P]roportional representation is a factor that may be considered in
determining whether a violation of § 2 has occurred."), aff'd, 32 F.3d 1265 (8th Cir. 1994).
169. "Narrowcasting" refers to the tendency in recent years for television and radio
stations to switch from programs designed to appeal to the general public to specialized,
non-mainstream programs targeting specific demographic niches. See, e.g., David
Waterman, "Narrowcasting"and "Broadcasting"on NonbroadcastMedia: A Program
Choice Model, COMM. RES., Feb. 1992, at 3, 4-5.
170. To be sure, neighborhood-based voting in a given jurisdiction would likely be
greater in a district system than an alternative system. This, however, merely reflects the
fact that district voters have less opportunity to vote in ways not influenced by geography.
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constituent-incumbent interaction more problematic. According to
this argument, when incumbents are not tied to a discrete geographic
area but instead have a jurisdiction-wide constituency, they have less
incentive to perform constituent service and less patience for the
constituent who drops in at the neighborhood district office. In
addition, a voter would feel less of a connection to "her"
representative when the voter selects five different people rather than
one person. Alternative schemes would thus do away with the
connection between a constituent and her "neighborhood
representative."
This argument lacks merit at the local level, at least with respect
to small jurisdictions. Most local jurisdictions to which the legal
theory advanced in this Article would be applied are small enough
that in-person constituent-incumbent contact is feasible even if
incumbents have jurisdiction-wide constituencies. 171 Constituents
able to contact a representative conveniently will not be shy about
requesting constituent service, and good politicians will know it is in
their interest to accede to such requests whenever possible. Indeed,
most local jurisdictions used to employ traditional, winner-take-all
systems before Voting Right Act concerns prompted them to switch
Thus, this "constituent-incumbent interaction"
to districting. 72
concern must not have meant much to these local jurisdictions.
Where the jurisdiction is larger, the desire for a truly "local"
representative could be satisfied by combining district and alternative
systems. Presumably, a larger population might allow for a larger
number of representatives in the governing body. For example, the
City Council of New York has fifty-one seats. 7 3 A large number of
seats allows for a sufficient number of district representatives to be
elected from relatively small, "intimate" districts, while still leaving
available a suitable number of at-large seats to bring the threshold of
exclusion down low enough to provide access for cohesive
minorities. 7 4 Such a mixed system is also used in Peoria, Illinois, and
171. For example, the City of Chicago Heights, where a district court recently imposed
a cumulative voting remedy, has a total population of only 33,072. See McCoy v. Chicago
Heights, 6 F. Supp. 2d 973, 976 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
172- See, e.g., Westwego Citizens for Better Gov't v. City of Westwego, 946 F.2d 1109,
1109 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that the city's at-large method of electing aldermen diluted
the voting strength of black citizens).
173. See Brooklyn Heights Ass'n v. Macchiarola, 623 N.E.2d 1140, 1140 (N.Y. 1993)
(per curiam).
174. Again, historical usage is instructive. Prior to the expansion to 51 seats, the New
York City Council had only 35 seats. See id. In a city as large as New York, a mere 35
seats must naturally make constituent-incumbent interaction unwieldy, yet that system
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until recently, in Alamogordo, New Mexico, 175 as well as in Germany

and Japan. 176 An alternative solution would be to divide the
jurisdiction into multimember districts and permit each district to use
limited, cumulative, or preference voting to elect representatives. As

long as each multimember district is small enough to facilitate
constituent-incumbent contact, such an approach would satisfy this
concern.

Another common criticism of alternative systems is that
alternative systems fuel racial bloc voting and fragment the polity into
competing racial and ethnic factions, creating the very
"balkanization" feared by Justice O'Connor in Shaw.177 This
argument is troubling but ultimately unpersuasive. No empirical
evidence exists to show that racially polarized voting actually
increases as a result of the adoption of alternative electoral systems.
Indeed, one argues just as easily that to allow minority candidates to
be elected and to show white voters that they can function effectively,
the use of alternative systems, like the use of any vote dilution
remedy, might have the long-term effect of reducing racial bloc
voting.
To have legally significant racial bloc voting, jurisdictions
continued until 1991. See id.
175. See Mulroy, supranote 8, at 346 n.67 (discussing Alamogordo's system).
176. See AMY, supra note 48, at 229 (describing the German system); Reform to Spell
Major Changes, JAPAN TIMES, Mar. 11, 1994, at 3 (describing Japan's system).
177. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993) (discussing concerns regarding
"balkanization" underlying the Shaw cause of action). For examples of this criticism of
alternative electoral systems, see Cousin v. Sundquist, 145 F.3d 818, 830 (6th Cir. 1998)
(citing Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1546 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc)), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 1026 (1999); Nicholas R. Miller, Pluralismand Social Choice, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
734, 743 (1983). For a discussion of "fragmentation" criticisms and responses thereto, see
Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REV.
1413, 1489-94 (1991); Karlan, supranote 127, at 230-31.
178. Some commentators have argued that racial bloc voting is on the decline in this
country, citing the electoral victories of several black congressional candidates from
majority-white districts.
See, e.g., Charles Krauthammer, Who Needs Racial
Gerrymanders?,WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1996, at A31. However, most of the candidates in
question were incumbents of previous minority-oriented districts that were then redrawn
after Shaw challenges. See Michael A. Fletcher, New Tolerance in the Old South or Old
Power of Incumbency?, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 1996, at Al. At least some of these
candidates credit their incumbency and the Voting Rights Act for their electoral success in
their new majority-white venues. See, e.g., Cynthia A. McKinney, Editorial, A Product of
the Voting Rights Act, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1996, at A15. Recent empirical studies do
not support the notion that racial considerations are diminishing in relevance. See, e.g.,
LUBLIN, supra note 156, at 3-4, 41-48 (describing statistical analysis of over 5000
congressional election contests between 1972 and 1994 and concluding, after controlling
for other factors, that "race overwhelms all other factors" in explaining electoral outcomes
and that districts under 45% in black population "almost never elect black
representatives").
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usually must average other-race "crossover voting" levels below
30% 17 9 -that is, more than 70% of white and black voters regularly
must vote along racial lines. Most jurisdictions with successful section
2 challenges have much more pronounced racial bloc voting rates.'

There is very little room for voting to get more polarized at these
levels. At less polarized levels, no section 2 liability exists, and no
court can impose alternative electoral systems. This fear that

alternative systems would aggravate racial bloc voting seems
unwarranted.

On the contrary, evidence in some communities suggests
alternative systems encourage not only the formation of cross-racial
coalitions but also representatives of different racial and ethnic
groups to work together. That was the experience in Cincinnati and

New York City during their use of preference voting earlier this
century, 81 as well as the more recent experience with the use of
preference

voting

in

Cambridge,

Massachusetts.Y

Indeed,

proportional representation systems are widely seen as the solution to
the problem of polities divided bitterly among entrenched ethnic

groups.Y13 For example, it is no accident that preference voting is a
key component of the recent peace plan in Northern Ireland."s It has
The exact extent (or lack thereof) of recent improvement in cross-racial voting is
irrelevant to the inquiry of this Article, however. Levels of polarization vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In jurisdictions with legally significant racial bloc voting,
plaintiffs can make a section 2 claim and, if successful, trigger the remedial analysis
explained here. Where they cannot prove legally significant racial bloc voting, their
section 2 claim fails, and this Article's remedial analysis is never reached.
179. See, e.g., Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 92 (1997) (upholding the district court's
finding of no racially polarized voting, based in part on white crossover levels ranging
from 22% to 38% and black crossover levels from 20% to 23%).
180. See, e.g., Westwego Citizens for Better Gov't v. City of Westwego, 946 F.2d 1109,
1118 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing black and white bloc voting levels of 89% and 84%,
respectively); Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City of Gretna, 834 F.2d 496, 502 (5th Cir.
1987) (citing black bloc voting levels over 95%).
181. See Burnham, supra note 61, at 142-45 (describing black coalitions with white
Democrats and white Republicans in the -1920s and 1930s); Zeller & Bone, supra note 61,
at 1139-42 (describing a multiracial coalition backing proportional representation in New
York in the 1940s, as well as voter support crossing over ethnic lines); cf. Karlan, supra
note 127, at 247 (noting that the supermajority requirement on the Mobile City Councilanother vote dilution remedy--"has distinctly improved political interaction between
whites and blacks in Mobile").
182. See AMY, supra note 48, at 166-67 (quoting a former Cambridge school committee
member as saying that "[p]roportional representation is the reason Cambridge didn't burn
during the years of demonstrations, the reason desegregation of the schools was achieved
without any significant disruption").
183. See id.; Arend Lijphart, Constitutional Choices for New Democracies, 2 J.
DEMOCRACY

72,81 (1991).

184. See Deaglan de Breadun, News Features, IRISH TIMES, May 30, 1998, at 10
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fostered religious harmony in the Irish Republic, while the single-

member plurality system formerly used in Northern Ireland has been
blamed for inflaming religious tensions by shutting out the Catholic
185
minority.
At least as compared to district systems, the flexibility enjoyed
under alternative systems creates less of a danger of "balkanization."
Voters are free to identify the characteristics or positions that are
most important to them and then vote for a like candidate anywhere

in the system without being trapped into a partisan or racial face-off
within a single district. This ability to "self-district" empowers not
just ethnic and racial minorities, but ideological, partisan, and sexual
orientation minorities as well.186 Indeed, some of the local Alabama

cumulative voting elections held pursuant to the Dillard litigation
resulted in the election of a Republican candidate for the first time in
modern history. 18
A hypothetical black, female, lesbian,
environmentalist, Perot-supporter could vote on the basis of any
combination of personal characteristics she views as salient or not and
still enjoy relative confidence that her vote will not be consistently
overwhelmed by some majority voting bloc. If anything, such
flexibility should make racial and ethnic bloc voting less likely. 88
A related criticism of alternative systems is that they allow the
election of "radical" or "fringe" candidates. 8 9 A commonly cited
(discussing the proportionality electoral features of the new governing body in Ireland and
its role in ensuring cooperation in the "divided society" of Northern Ireland).
185. See REIN TAAGEPERA & MATrHEw S. SHUGART, SEATS AND VOTES: THE

EFFECrS

AND DETERMINANTS OF ELECrORAL SYSTEMS

63 (1989) (noting that the

Protestant domination of Parliament excluded Catholics from participation in contentious
issues "until all too many Catholics replaced their meaningless ballots with bullets"). For
further discussion of preference voting's tendency to foster "crossover" voting for
"outsiders," see infra note 20 and accompanying text.
186. See Engstrom et al., supra note 6, at 293 ("Other voters [besides minorities] that
share interests and candidate preferences can employ the cumulative options to help elect
candidates of their choice .... [P]olitical parties that do not attract a plurality of the
votes[] and womeno] are commonly identified as likely beneficiaries .... "); Darren
Rosenblum, Geographically Sexual?: Advancing Lesbian and Gay Interests Through
ProportionalRepresentation,31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 119 (1996) (arguing for the use
of proportional representation to advance gay and lesbian voting concerns).
187. See Engstrom et al., supra note 6, at 297.
188. By making this comparison to district systems, I do not mean to indicate a
rejection of minority districts, which I believe have their place in a court's remedial
arsenal; nor do I mean to imply acceptance of the argument that minority districting fuels
racial bloc voting or racial separatism. At most, minority districting brings out into the
open racial divisions that already exist. By allowing alienated minorities a role in the
process, minority districts and alternative systems have an ameliorative effect on racial
and ethnic tensions.
189. See AMY, supranote 48, at 172-77.
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example is the prominence of religious extremist parties in Israel. 90
The response to this criticism is that political access by fringe groups
occurs only when the threshold of exclusion is set to very low levels.
Until recently, in the Israeli Knesset, the threshold was only 1% of
the national vote. 191 Contrast post-war Germany, which has seen a
relatively stable and moderate series of governments in a system
employing an across-the-board requirement of 5% of the vote for all
national elections.Y2
Fairness requires that there be some level of support at which a
candidate's share of the vote is high enough-say, 10%, 20%, or
30%-that he or she must be viewed as deserving a seat at the table.
While individuals may differ about what that minimum is, voters can
collectively decide what the threshold ought to be and set it
accordingly. 193 In the local jurisdictions where such systems might be
imposed by court order under section 2, the number of seats is low
enough, and therefore the threshold of exclusion high enough, to
satisfy this concern as a practical matter. Thresholds will usually be
more than 10% with nine seats or less and often more than 20% with
four seats or less. 94
Once liability is established using the threshold of
exclusion/Gingles analysis advocated in this Article, the actual
minimum vote percentage required of a candidate can be adjusted to
If a threshold
account for any "fringe candidate" concerns.
"naturally" derived from the number of existing seats' 95 were deemed
too low, a flat requirement for a minimum share of the vote could be
imposed, triggering runoff elections among the "losers" when an
insufficient number of candidates exceeds the cutoff.196

Such an

adjustment should be permissible as long as it is not motivated by an
190. See id. at 169.

191. See id. at 170.
192. See id. at 170, 229.
193. The threshold can be raised by a number of different mechanisms. Most simply, a

flat minimum can be established, as in Germany. Alternatively, the number of at-large
seats to be filled using an alternative system in any given election can be reduced through
the use of staggered terms, multimember districts, or a mixed system of single-member
district and at-large seats.
194. See Mulroy, supra note 8, at 380 n.110.
195. In Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994), the Supreme Court held that the size of a
governing body is not subject to a section 2 challenge. See id. at 885. Thus, it seems that
the total number of seats on a governing body cannot be changed by court order under
section 2.
196. The discussion of the "balkanization" and "fringe" arguments set out above is
taken from Mulroy, supra note 8, at 352-55. For a discussion of the additional criticism
that preference voting systems are too confusing, see infra 221-24 and accompanying text.
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unconstitutional purpose and does not have the effect of excluding a
statutorily protected minority group.
Although opponents of alternative systems may overstate the
extent to which extremist candidates would be elected and may pay
too little heed to the possibility that winner-take-all systems could
sometimes fuel extremism by shutting out and radicalizing a minority
bloc, they are right about the inherent moderating effect of the
current system. It is undeniable that winner-take-all systems tend to
elect more politically moderate candidates and force parties to hover
around the political "center."' 19 Defenders of the winner-take-all
system argue that this moderation reflects the inherent middle-of-theroad nature of the American electorate and favors a healthy
stability.1 98 But the moderation involved here is merely a reflection of
the narrow range of choices voters have under winner-take-all
systems. The will of the people should not be thwarted to promote an
artificial stasis: If greater ideological diversity is a truer reflection of
the electorate's overall preferences, then such diversity ought to be
allowed to exist. If, on the other hand, ideological moderation truly
results from the inherent middle-of-the road nature of the electorate,
then adopting a system which more accurately measures that nature
should not unduly change political results.
HI. CHOOSING AMONG ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES

Once a court opts for a non-district remedy, which of the three
alternative systems should it choose? Each system has advantages
and disadvantages, but grounds exist for a clear preference among the
three. 199
A. Limited Voting
Of the three types of alternative systems discussed in this Article,
limited voting is the least helpful alternative to districts. The most
compelling reason for this conclusion is the threshold of exclusion
197. This moderating, centrist effect of the winner-take-all system is not in serious
dispute among political scientists. See, e.g., ANTHONY DoWNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY
OF DEMOCRACY 114-41 (1957); THEODORE LOWI & BENJAMIN GINSBERG, AMERICAN

GOVERNMENT: FREEDOM AND POWER 498

(1990); ALAN STONE & RICHARD BARKE,

GOVERNING THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: ECONOMICS, LAW, AND POLICIES 121 (1985).

198. See AMY, supranote 48, at 80, 170-71 (describing this argument); see also id. at 2627 (describing in greater detail the winner-take-all systems' tendency to overrepresent the
leading voting bloc).
199. For an explanation of each of these three systems, see supra notes 46-61 and
accompanying text.
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formula." ° This formula consistently yields a higher threshold of
exclusion for a given number of seats with limited voting as opposed
to either cumulative or preference voting.201 Limited voting is thus a
less powerful tool for enhancing minority voting strength and less
effective at remedying minority vote dilution. Given the small size of
local governments in the United States, limited voting would
normally yield a high threshold of exclusion-too high for the
relevant minority group in many cases.
For example, the limited voting plan at issue in Cleveland County
allowed each voter to cast four votes to fill seven seats,2°2 yielding a
threshold of exclusion of 36.6%. Because blacks constituted only
18.8% of the county's voting age population,20 3 this system by no
means assured that black voters would have a realistic opportunity to
elect candidates of their choice. In order for the threshold to
approach closely the black voters' share of the population, each voter
would have to be further limited to casting two votes, which would
yield a threshold of 22%.2o4 Even that figure leaves the threshold
slightly higher than what would be needed under the "potential-toelect" standard I propose. 0 5
The Cleveland County scenario is fairly typical and illustrates the
sharp reductions in the number of votes available to voters to make
limited voting a truly effective vote dilution remedy. For limited
voting to match the remedial power of cumulative or preference
voting, of course, the number of votes would have to be limited to
one per voter, 205 even though the election was to fill several open
seats. Such a stark limitation on the voter's potential ability to
influence the electoral outcome is an unsatisfactory result for a
lawsuit designed to strengthen voting rights. °7
200. The formula is expressed as:
(# votes each voter has)/[(# votes each voter has) + (# seats open)] = threshold of
exclusion.
201. The one exception is when each voter is allowed only one vote, in which case the
limited voting threshold reduces to the same as that for cumulative and preference voting.
202. See Cleveland County Ass'n for Gov't by the People v. Cleveland County Bd. of
Comm'rs, 965 F. Supp. 72,75 (D.D.C.), rev'd,142 F.3d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
203. See id. at 74.
204. The mathematical expression is (2 / (2+7)).
205. The "potential-to-elect" standard for liability would require section 2 plaintiffs to
make a prima facie showing that the relevant minority group's population would meet or
surpass the formula-derived threshold of exclusion for the electoral scheme sought as the
section 2 remedy. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
206. See supra text accompanying note 65.
207. To take one concrete example, it would probably frustrate the white majority if it
were necessary to limit the number of votes to be cast to less than half the open seats to be
filled. In such an instance, it would be difficult for the majority bloc voters to know how to
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Limited voting's greatest advantage is its simplicity. A voter
need not decide how to distribute multiple votes among candidates,
as in cumulative voting, or rank them in order of preference, as in
preference voting. The voter must cast only one vote per preferred
candidate, as is customary in the United States. It is therefore the
system to which the typical voter could adapt most easily.
This advantage is also limited voting's worst flaw, however. This
system is the simplest of the three because it provides the least
flexibility for the voter. The voter has neither the opportunity to
express the intensity of his preference, as in cumulative voting, nor to
indicate which candidates are the most and least preferred, as in
preference voting. Moreover, the total number of votes the voter gets
to cast is lowest in this system. In both of the other two systems, a
voter customarily has at least as many votes as there are seats to be
filled.0 8 If a voter likes a number of candidates, it is harder to choose
in limited voting because there are fewer votes to go around. In
cumulative voting, a voter has at least a theoretical chance of casting
all the votes for all the candidates who win. Limited voting, however,
is designed to ensure that a voter cannot choose all representatives to
fill the seats. The system is truly "limited" in more ways than one.
B.

Cumulative Voting
For the reasons discussed above, cumulative voting is
substantially superior to limited voting as a remedy for minority vote
dilution. Except for the rare-and unsatisfactory-case where each
voter is restricted to one vote, minority voters have a lower threshold
of exclusion, and thus more electoral access, under cumulative voting.
In addition, the flexibility provided by allowing voters to express the
intensity of their preferences has strong intuitive appeal.
Cumulative voting, however, does have serious disadvantages. It
places a premium on political organization. To succeed at electing
candidates of choice, a cohesive minority voting bloc must be: (1)
sufficiently sophisticated and politically mobilized to engage in
vote so as to elect a majority of the seats.

208. See supra text accompanying note 52 (noting that a voter in a cumulative voting
system usually has a number of votes equal to the number of seats to be filled). In
preference voting, a voter is said to have one vote which is "transferred" from first-choice
to second-choice and then third-choice candidates.
See supra notes 56-61 and
accompanying text. By being able to rank each candidate individually, a voter has, by
definition, a number of differentially weighted votes equal to the number of candidates
running. Because the number of candidates running must exceed the number of open
seats if the election is to have any meaning, one can speak of a preference voting system
voter as having a number of votes equal to or greater than the number of available seats.
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"strategic voting"; and (2) sufficiently disciplined to limit the number
of minority candidates so as to avoid "intra-group competition."2

9

Each of these attributes comes with its own complexities.
Regarding strategic voting, the minority voters need to be aware
of and be prepared to employ the mathematical advantage of
"plumping" votes. When the minority's share of the electorate is only
large enough to provide a realistic chance of electing one candidate of

choice, the voting strategy is simple:

All minority voters should

plump all their votes for the minority candidate. 210

When the

minority's population is large enough to consider electing more than
one candidate of choice, the task of the minority group's leaders
becomes a bit more complicated. They must ensure that their group's
voters distribute their votes roughly equally among the minority
" ' Otherwise, excess votes for one minority candidate
candidates.21
may be "wasted," resulting in another minority candidate garnering
too few votes to be elected.

One modification of the usual form of cumulative voting may
alleviate this concern. From 1880 to 1980, the Illinois House 2of
12

Representatives used the "fractional" form of cumulative voting.

209. See Robert B. McDuff, JudicialElections and the Voting Rights Act, 38 LOY. L.
REv. 931, 989 (1993); Still, supra note 12, at 256-57; Note, supra note 52, at 153 n.44.
210. The actual electoral experience under cumulative voting suggests that minority
voters appreciate this strategic fact and do indeed vote accordingly. Electoral returns and
exit surveys in local jurisdictions using cumulative voting indicate that racial and ethnic
minority voters "plumped" their votes behind one candidate at a higher rate than other
voters and that this strategic voting was instrumental to the minority candidates' victories.
See Engstrom, supra note 47, at 753-55. For a more detailed discussion of the evidence
linking the ability to "plump" with racial and ethnic minority candidates' victories, see
Engstrom et al., supranote 130, at 489-95, and Engstrom & Barrilleaux, supra note 130, at
391-92. A more recent article by Brischetto and Engstrom is particularly informative and
illustrates examples in which higher strategic voting rates among minority voters allowed
electoral victories even when the minority's share of the electorate was slightly lower than
the threshold of exclusion. See Brishchetto & Engstrom, supranote 54, at 978-89.
211. For the purpose of this discussion of "strategic voting," it is assumed that there is
no "intra-group competition." That is, it is assumed that the number of minority
candidates fielded always equals the number of seats the minority is likely to fill given the
threshold of exclusion. If the minority population is such that only one minority-preferred
candidate can realistically be elected under the threshold of exclusion analysis, the
minority community fields only one candidate; if the threshold of exclusion analysis
suggests that minority voters can elect two candidates of choice, only two minority
candidates run, and so on. In practice, minority voters in cumulative voting jurisdictions
will likely have to deal simultaneously with both the problems of "strategic voting" and
"intra-group competition."
212. A 1980 referendum amending the state constitution to reduce the size of the
Illinois House of Representatives by one-third and establish a single-member district
system eliminated the Illinois cumulative voting system. Citizens took the initiative and
placed the referendum on the ballot after legislators provided themselves a 40% pay
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In this form (also called "equal and even"), voters simply place an
"X" next to one or more names of candidates, and each candidate
receiving an "X" gets an equal share of that voter's total number of
votes. If a voter may cast three votes, for example, but marks only
two candidates, each candidate is automatically assigned one and onehalf votes. As long as the number of minority candidates does not
exceed the number of seats the minority group will be expected to
obtain based on the threshold of exclusion, this variety would
eliminate the "strategic voting" problem. It would do so, however, by
sacrificing voter flexibility in distributing votes to signal intensity of
preference among candidates.
Such a "fractional" scheme of cumulative voting also would not
alleviate the separate problem of "intra-group competition." To elect
candidates of choice under a cumulative voting system, the minority
group's members not only must vote strategically, but also must show
sufficient restraint to avoid fielding too many candidates. If the
threshold of exclusion analysis suggests that the minority group may
realistically expect to fill two seats, only two minority candidates
should run. If more than two candidates run, they potentially split the
minority group, jeopardizing the minority's chances of electing any
candidate. In practice, of course, voters of any given group do not
split their votes equally among candidates from that group.
Therefore, even if three minority candidates ran instead of two in the
example above, the votes may be sufficiently concentrated on the two
most popular candidates that one or both of them will still get elected.
It is unlikely that the votes will be split evenly enough to deny all of
the three minority candidates a seat. But as the number of minority
candidates grows beyond three, the minority group's hopes of electing
any candidates of choice fade. This problem of intra-group
competition arises frequently in many types of electoral settings and
is a significant electoral factor in cumulative and limited voting
systems.213
increase, and the changes in the voting method reportedly "'had little or nothing to do
with support/opposition to cumulative voting.'" Engstrom, supra note 47, at 752 n.26
(quoting Bernard Grofman, Alternatives to Single-Member Plurality Districts: Legal and
Empirical Issues, in REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICTING ISSUES 107, 121 (Bernard
Grofman et al. eds., 1982)).
213. See Engstrom, supra note 47, at 767; Still, supra note 12, at 255-57. Of course, this
dynamic can work in reverse: Too many white candidates can run, splitting the white vote
and allowing the election of minority candidates. Intra-group competition, however, is
more of a danger for minority voters because a minority group's position is inherently
more tenuous. A majority voting bloc (i.e., a bloc with more than 50% of the vote voting
cohesively) bears no risk of being entirely shut out, for example, and usually will elect at
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Because of the problems of strategic voting, intra-group
competition, and the general novelty of cumulative voting to many
voters, the U.S. Department of Justice looks carefully at the
sophistication and mobilization level of minority voters when making
administrative "preclearance" determinations of proposed cumulative
voting schemes under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.214 Because
cumulative voting differs greatly from present systems in the United
States, an important consideration is the extent to which the
jurisdiction adopting cumulative voting will educate voters on the
new system.215
C. Preference Voting
For the reasons outlined below, preference voting is the best
potential vote dilution remedy of the three alternative systems
currently used in the United States. Preference voting has several key
advantages over limited and cumulative voting.
First, unlike
cumulative and limited voting, preference voting is a true
"proportional" system. Cumulative and limited voting are referred to
as "semi-proportional" systems because they achieve more
proportionality than single-member or traditional at-large elections,
but they do not achieve complete proportionality.2 16 Preference
voting can achieve true proportionality between votes cast and
electoral outcomes: A cohesive racial, partisan, ideological, or other
group that casts 37% of the votes will elect very close to 37% of the
seats. Thus, preference voting is a more accurate reflection of the
popular will than either cumulative or limited voting. This greater
proportionality stems from the multiple rounds of ballot-counting in
which "surplus" votes of winners and "wasted" votes of losers are
"transferred" to the voters' next-ranked candidates. This mechanism
of multiple iterations is sometimes referred to as the "Hare
217
system.
Second, intra-group competition is not a problem under
least a majority of the representatives. See AMY, supra note 48, at 161; Still & Richie,
supra note 153, at 21-22.
214. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994)).
215. See Mulroy, supra note 135, at 67-69.
216. See AMY, supra note 48, at 186; Still, supranote 12, at 258.
217. See Doron, supra note 56, at 918-20 (discussing "Hare system"). The system is
named after its inventor, Thomas Hare. See Alexander Athan Yanos, Note, Reconciling
the Right to Vote with the Voting Rights Act, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1810, 1859 (1992).
Variations of Hare's original mathematical algorithm exist and are prevalent today. These
algorithms are usually referred to as the Hare system as well.
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preference voting because votes are "transferred" from one candidate
to another in multiple rounds of counting based on the ranking given
to candidates.218 For example, if a cohesive minority realistically can
expect to fill only two seats, and seven minority candidates run,
minority voters do not need to decide in advance which two
candidates are the "favored" minority candidates. As long as
minority voters generally rank the minority candidates above the
non-minority candidates, the relative ranking of minority candidates
is irrelevant. The minority voters' votes will all be transferred from
minority candidate to minority candidate until the two seats are filled.
Thus, preference voting does not encourage or require cohesive
minorities to try to limit the field of citizens wishing to run for office
and participate in the political process.219
Third, strategic voting is not a problem in a preference voting
system. A voter need not worry about the strategic, mathematical
side effects of his or her allocation of votes. All a voter must do is
follow the instructions on the ballot and rank the candidates in order
of preference-the Hare system will take care of the rest. Thus,
preference voting has the advantage that the intuitively obvious thing
to do is also the strategically smart thing to do.
Likewise, because voters rank candidates, they may express
support for an "outsider" candidate from another party, race, gender,
ethnicity, or ideological persuasion without sacrificing support for
"insider" candidates of that relevant group. This feature allows the
creation of cross-racial coalitions, and other sorts of coalitions, which
act as "anti-balkanizers." For example, a black voter may choose to
rank a black candidate first, but then rank a white candidate who
generally holds similar views second. This voting pattern increases
the incentive for candidates-even candidates associated with a
particular race, party, ideological persuasion, or other cohesive voting
bloc-to reach out to members of other constituencies for
"crossover" votes. Cumulative voting has also been said-in my view,
correctly-to foster such "crossover" coalitions. 20 In cumulative
voting, however, every vote cast for such an "outsider" candidate is
one less vote available for an "insider" candidate. Preference voting
poses no such dilemmas, thus alleviating the problem of inter-group
as well as intra-group competition.
218. See Richard L. Engstrom, The Single Transferable Vote: An Alternative Remedy
for Minority Vote Dilution,27 U.S.F. L. REV. 781, 791 (1993).
219. See Engstrom, supra note 47, at 767.
220. See, e.g., Guinier, supra note 53, at 1141 n.304 (describing the evolution of
crossracial "self-defined voluntary constituencies" under cumulative voting).
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The ranking mechanism also allows voters to take chances on
less well-known candidates or non-mainstream candidates who may
be perceived as "long-shots." Again, in cumulative and limited voting
(and even more so in district or traditional at-large voting), every vote
cast for such a "long-shot" candidate is one less vote available for a
more "electable" candidate and thus is arguably a "wasted" vote. In
preference voting, however, a voter can take a chance and indulge her
quixotic impulses, safe in the knowledge that if the underdog does not
garner enough votes to win a seat, the voter's second choice vote for a
more mainstream candidate will be duly recorded and effectuated.
This dynamic gives a small minority group well below the
threshold of exclusion (for example, the Asian community in Detroit,
Michigan) an opportunity to run a candidate anyway. The candidate
can generate attention, articulate the minority's concerns, and help
the community either by winning a seat or by causing rival candidates
to compete for the minority group's second choice votes.
Several arguments against preference voting bear discussion.
First, some critics argue that the system is too complex.l' It is true
that the mathematical iterations involved in the ballot-counting
process are very complexY2
The voter, however, need not
understand the intricacies of the Hare system in order for the system
to work-just as voters need not understand how the voting machine
works or exactly how their presidential votes affect the Electoral
College count. The voter only needs to understand how to cast a
ballot. To follow an instruction such as "Please rank the candidates
in order of preference by placing a '1,' '2,' and so on next to the
candidate's name" seems like a pretty straightforward task. In the
first year that preference voting was used in Northern Ireland's
national elections in 1921, only 1% of the ballots were invalidated in
an election with 89% turnout.P In Cambridge, Massachusetts, where
preference voting has been used for years, invalid ballots have
remained at a constant 2% rate. 224
221. See, e.g., AMY, supranote 48, at 155. This criticism applies to cumulative voting as
well. See Engstrom et al., supra note 6, at 294-95.
222. For detailed descriptions of the mathematical steps needed to complete the
multiple rounds of elimination involved in the Hare system, see AMY, supra note 48, at
237-38 app. C, and Engstrom, supra note 47, at 765-69. Engstrom provides a diagram that
is particularly helpful. See Engstrom, supra note 47, at 766.
223. See JENIMER HART, PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION:

CRITICS OF THE

BRITISH ELECrORAL SYSTEM, 1820-1945, at 202-05 (1992) (outlining the use of
proportional representation in the United Kingdom).
224. See AMY, supra note 48, at 156. Similarly, empirical studies of the use of
cumulative voting in recent elections have shown that voter confusion is not a significant
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A related objection is that preference voting elections are costly
and burdensome to administer.2
Local election officials would
either need a computer to calculate the vote-transfer iterations, or
several staff members to perform these transfers by hand over several
days .26 Initially, a wait of several days to tabulate election results
does not seem fatal for a local jurisdiction-winning candidates do
not usually take office immediately after an election. Such a wait is
not necessary, however, because computer software is now available
that can perform the vote count within minutes on any standard
personal computer, 7 an item within the budgetary reach of most
local jurisdictions.
In the long run, preference voting elections can be cheaper to
administer because the jurisdiction can dispense with a primary
election.
By automatically sorting voter preferences among
candidates within particular parties, preference voting produces what
can be called an "instant primary." Thus, the jurisdiction would have
one less election to administer (or two less elections, if a runoff
primary were required)-a savings that, over the course of a few
election cycles, would pay for a personal computer and all requisite
software.
Opponents of preference voting have also critiqued the system
on technical grounds. With the right combination of votes,
preference voting can cause the outcome to depend upon voters'
preferences among losing candidates and in some cases can even
cause a candidate to lose because she has "too many" first place
votes.8 The former "anomalous" 9 possibility, however, also exists
problem. See Brischetto & Engstrom, supra note 54, at 978-79 (outlining exit poll data
from a first-time cumulative voting election in Texas indicating 90% of voters understood
the system); Engstrom et al., supra note 6, at 293-95 (relaying exit poll data of cumulative
voting elections in New Mexico and South Dakota indicating that 90% of voters
understood the system and did not find it any more difficult to use than other voting
systems); Engstrom & Barrilleaux, supra note 130, at 391 (finding that both Native
American and Anglo voters understood the cumulative voting system); Richard L.
Engstrom & Robert R. Brischetto, Is Cumulative Voting Too Complex?: Evidence From
Exit Polls, 27 STETSON L. REv. 813, 821-27 (1998) (noting that exit poll data showed no
significant voter confusion and that when asked to compare it to other election methods
they had experienced, more voters found cumulative voting relatively easier).
225. Telephone interview with Dr. Richard Engstrom, Department of Political Science,
University of New Orleans (Apr. 19, 1999); see also AMY, supra note 48, at 157 (discussing
the criticism that vote counts under preference voting systems create administrative
burdens).
226. In past Cambridge, Massachusetts, elections using preference voting, hand counts
took about five days. See Still & Richie, supra note 153, at 24.
227. See id.
228. See, e.g., Doron, supra note 56, at 920-21 (showing how an outcome can be
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in cumulative and limited voting."0 Nor is there any evidence to
suggest that such outcomes will tend to occur to the benefit of any

particular type of candidate-that is, it is not a substantive bias
present in the system. It is impossible for a candidate or party to

manipulate this phenomenon in advance of the election in her or its
favor? 1 These technical criticisms do not argue for any one
alternative system over another, and they are outweighed by other
advantages in any comparison with district or at-large systems. 2
A more significant criticism is that, unlike cumulative voting,
preference voting does not allow the voter to express the intensity of
his preference for particular candidates. At first glance, it may seem
that preference voting allows for such expression by allowing for the
ranking of candidates. It is not necessarily the case, however, that the

incremental degree of preference between the candidate ranked 2
and the candidate ranked 3 is the same as the degree of preference

between the candidate marked 3 and the one marked 4. For example,
it might be the case that candidates ranked 1, 2, and 3 are virtually
interchangeable for the voter, but they are all vastly preferable to the

determined by preference among losing candidates); Gideon Doron & Richard Kronick,
Single Transferable Vote: An Example of a Perverse Social Choice Function, 21 AM. J.
POL. Sci. 303, 307-09 (1977) (giving a hypothetical example of a candidate losing because
of increased first-choice support).
229. Rather than being anomalous, voter preference among losing candidates may in
fact be a perfectly appropriate determinant of electoral outcomes. An analogous situation
can occur during multiple rounds of balloting at political conventions when an eliminated
candidate determined the outcome by throwing his support behind one of the remaining
candidates. In effect, the multiple rounds of vote-counting in preference voting serve this
function.
230. When elections turn on voter preferences among losing candidates, there is a
violation of the so-called "reduction principle." This phenomena can occur in limited,
cumulative, and preference voting. For an illustration of how it can happen, see Still,
supranote 12, at 260.
Of course, more severe anomalies can occur in traditional at-large or single-member
district elections. In both, 51% of the electorate can obtain 100% of the representation,
and, in multiple-candidate races, a slender plurality can elect a slightly preferred candidate
despite intense opposition by the overwhelming majority, beating out a candidate who was
the close second choice of 100% of the voters. In district elections, gerrymandering can
ensure that a small minority party maintains firm majority control over the legislative
body.
231. See Letter from Robert Richie to author, supra note 6.
232. These criticisms are also somewhat theoretical. There is nothing about preference
voting that makes such outcomes likely as a general rule. Thus, for example, there is no
upper limit on the amount of first-place votes a candidate should want to receive in a
preference voting election. Instead, it is merely the case that one can imagine two sets of
voter rankings, A and B, in which a particular candidate achieves worse results in A
despite having more first-place votes. See Still, supra note 12, at 261 (explaining the
election dynamic through one hypothetical scenario).
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candidate ranked 4. One can argue that preference voting allows for
no such subtleties, forcing all voters into a one-size-fits-all construct
in which the intensity of voters' preferences is spaced arbitrarily and
evenly along a number line.
This objection, while valid, is simply outweighed by the
advantages of preference voting. Moreover, no electoral system is
perfect: One can always point to a particular hypothetical in which an
electoral system would perform "better" than another. Ultimately,
one must pick one's preferred electoral evils. As sins go, the
"uniform gradations of preference" and theoretical violation of the
"reduction principle" seem more venal than mortal.
IV. THE SPECIAL CASE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS

Vote dilution challenges to an at-large method of electing judges
have one unique aspect distinguishing them from vote dilution
challenges to electoral systems in other contexts: Courts have
determined that as a matter of law, jurisdictions have a substantial
interest in maintaining "linkage" between the electoral bases of a
judge and the area over which the judge exercises jurisdiction.2 3
Courts, therefore, have determined that single-member districts were
inappropriate remedies in judicial election cases because they make
judges electorally accountable to a small subset of their courts' overall
jurisdiction, potentially upsetting both the fact and appearance of
impartiality.23
Alternative electoral systems would thus serve as an ideal
remedy in judicial election cases. Because such a remedy would
retain the at-large nature of the election, the correspondence between
a judge's jurisdictional and electoral areas would be maintained.
Commentators have recognized the special propriety of alternative
remedies in this contextP35 Unfortunately, courts that have dealt with
233. See Cousin v. Sundquist, 145 F.3d 818, 827-28 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 1026 (1999); Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Sessions, 56 F.3d 1281,
1296-97 (11th Cir. 1995) (en banc); Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1542-44 (11th Cir. 1994);
League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 869
(5th Cir. 1993) (en banc); see also Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 501 U.S. 419,
426 (1991) (determining that a linkage interest is a relevant consideration under the
"totality of the circumstances" analysis and at the remedial phase).
234. See Sessions, 56 F.3d at 1296-97; Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1542-44; League of United
Latin Am. Citizens, 999 F.2d at 869. Given that litigants can regularly come from outside
the jurisdiction entirely-from across the state, nation, and even the world-the
importance of this "linkage" interest is open to question. States-and courts-claim to
take it seriously, however.
235. See, e.g., McDuff, supra note 209, at 988-89; Edward Still, Voluntary
Constituencies: Modified At-Large Voting as a Remedy for Minority Vote Dilution in
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this argument have not seen it this way. Instead, courts have
criticized the appropriateness of alternative electoral schemes,
particularly cumulative voting, as remedies in judicial elections.
Judge Tjoflat, Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, outlined these arguments in his en banc opinions in
Southern ChristianLeadership Conference v. Sessions 6 and Nipper v.
Smith. 3 7 In both cases, Judge Tjoflat stated that cumulative voting
would increase the competitiveness of judicial elections, thus
interfering with the need for collegiality peculiar to the judicial
context238 The increased competitiveness would also dissuade
qualified lawyers from considering judicial careers because they
would have to run against multiple incumbent judges and because it
would remove the current expectation that competent incumbent
judges, once elected, would be assured retention. 2 9
These criticisms are unfounded. First, the criticisms distinguish
judicial elections, for which cumulative voting is purportedly
inappropriate, from legislative elections, for which cumulative voting
presumably is permissible. This distinction relies on a supposed
special need for collegiality peculiar to, or more important to, judges.
But if "collegiality" among judges is important so that they can work
together harmoniously, it is hard to see why there would be less need
for collegiality among legislative officials, who must work together on
a far more intimate and daily basis than do most judges. This fact is
particularly true when the elections involve (as they so often do in
vote dilution cases) trial judges who do not normally work as part of
multimember judicial panels.24
JudicialElections, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 354,366-69 (1991).
236. 56 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 1995) (en bane).
237. 39 F.3d 1494 (11th Cir. 1994).
238. See Sessions, 56 F.3d at 1296 n.24; Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1546.
239. See Cousin v. Sundquist, 145 F.3d 818, 830-31 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 1026 (1999); Sessions, 56 F.3d at 1296 n.24; Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1546; see also Clark v.
Roemer, 777 F. Supp. 445, 468 (M.D. La. 1990) (preferring a single-member district plan
to a limited voting scheme as a remedy in a judicial election challenge because limited
voting made judicial re-election races more likely and noting that "[a]t present, a
competent judge frequently has no opposition for his re-election and no election is held,
rewarding the judge for his service").
240. See Sessions, 56 F.3d at 1314 (Hatchett, J., dissenting). In League of United Latin
American Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1990) (en bane),
rev'd sub nom. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Generalof Texas, 501 U.S. 419 (1991),
Judge Patrick Higgenbotham drew a different conclusion about the trial judge's sole, noncollegial decisionmaking, stating that it made the state's linkage interest stronger and that
trial judges were thus legally immune from vote dilution challenges as a general matter.
See id. at 650-51 (Higgenbotham, J., concurring in the judgment). The Supreme Court
reversed. Chief Judge Higgenbotham later wrote the en bane decision in League of United
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Second, there is no reason to think that cumulative voting would
actually change the dynamics of the election in such a way as to
threaten significantly the collegiality of judges. If the system being
challenged is a traditional at-large system without numbered places or
similar devices, then all candidates would already be running against
each other. Cumulative voting would not change that fact.
If the system being challenged does use numbered places,
residency districts, or even single-member districts, then a change to a
cumulative voting system would indeed make all incumbents run in
the same electoral contest where they did not do so before.2 41 The

pool of competing candidates, however, would be large enough to
render unnecessary the prospect of direct, head-to-head competition
between sitting judges. Candidates would not need to defeat all of
their opponents to win office. This increase in the pool of competing
candidates encourages a campaign strategy of self-promotion and
discourages negative campaigning, 242 which in turn tends to enhance
collegiality. Support for this notion comes from the cumulative
voting experience in Illinois, where representatives from the same
three-seat districts seemed to get along well, even when they were
from different parties.243
At any rate, an increase in the
competitiveness of elections seems a salutary advantage of cumulative
voting rather than a fatal flaw. 244
Latin American Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1994) (en
banc), that foreclosed the specific vote dilution claims brought against the election of trial
judges, in part on the basis of the linkage interest. See id. at 868-76.
"',
241. Traditional, winner-take-all systems using numbered places, residency districts,
and single-member districts would therefore be more likely to have head-to-head electoral
contests pitting a challenger against an incumbent. Thus, a switch away from one of these
systems to cumulative voting (which does not force such direct challenger-incumbent faceoffs) would tend to advantage challengers and disadvantage incumbents. Judge Tjoflat
cites this potential weakening of incumbent job security as a factor that would make
judicial positions less attractive and thus potentially discourage lawyers from running for
judicial office. See Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1546. He also suggests, however, that lawyers would
be discouraged from running under cumulative voting because they would have to run
against multiple incumbents. See id. This suggestion is a contradiction: Incumbents will
either be relatively weak, in which case few challengers would be deterred, or relatively
strong, in which case lawyers would be attracted to the position. See Sessions, 56 F.3d at
1314-15 (Hatchett, J., dissenting) (noting this contradiction). In either case, the concern is
speculative.
242. See Lani Guinier, The Representation of Minority Interests: The Question of
Single-Member Districts,14 CARDOZO L. REv. 1135,1137 (1993).
243. See Better Politics,supra note 4, at 12 (advocating a return to cumulative voting
for the state legislature).
244. See Sessions, 56 F.3d at 1314 (Hatchett, J., dissenting). It may be argued that
judicial elections require extra solicitousness for incumbent protection lest a judge be
influenced by popular opinion, but this risk of influence is inherent in an elected judiciary.
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Even if the adoption of cumulative voting results in increased
competition among incumbent judges, and even if that were for some
reason a result to be avoided, these problems can be solved with the
use of preference voting. When voters need not choose only one or a
few candidates, but can instead rank all candidates or as many as they
please in order of preference, incumbents do not have to compete
directly against each other, and thus collegiality is not disrupted.
Instead, each incumbent will be drawing on his own base of support,
whether such support derives from geography, race, or shades of
ideological difference. At the same time, no challenger has to
campaign directly against a specific incumbent in a head-to-head
contest. She merely has to say, "You may like some of the incumbent
judges, and they are indeed worthy jurists, but I'm a worthy
candidate.
You should rank me above at least some of the
incumbents." This feature avoids any undue discouragement of
promising lawyers on the verge of entering the electoral fray.
Further, because preference voting allows better odds for "longshot"
or "underdog" candidates,2 4 5 its use may actually encourage
candidates to step forward.
Although I believe preference voting is the best solution to
minority vote dilution both generally and in the specific context of
judicial election cases, I recognize that it may not work in all
jurisdictions.
In some jurisdictions, state law may bar its
consideration as a vote dilution remedy 2 4 In other jurisdictions,
preference voting's relative novelty as compared with cumulative
voting may cause a presiding federal judge or a defendant jurisdiction
to view this proposed remedy with suspicion. In such instances, it
might be possible to modify the cumulative voting system to
accommodate the concerns raised by the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits
in Nipper, Sessions, and League of United Latin American Citizens v.
Clements.247
The modification in question is the use of numbered posts or

We should either trust judges to be ethical and have open and competitive elections, or we
should appoint judges with or without retention elections. Holding elections while trying
to stifle competition risks the worst of both worlds.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 220-21.
246. For example, Illinois statutes present a number of different options from which
local governments may choose in adopting an electoral system, including single-member
districts and cumulative voting, but preference voting is not among them. See 65 ILL.
CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-2-1, 5/5-2-12 (West 1993). This seemingly exhaustive list of options

might be read to state that preference voting is not authorized by Illinois law.
247. 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
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residency districts. 24 Instead of all incumbents and challengers
running against each other in one plenary pool of candidates, each
incumbent would hold a numbered seat (for example, judicial posts 1,
2, and 3), and each challenger would have to declare a candidacy for
one seat only. The result would be a series of separate "minielections" in which each incumbent faces challengers, but no
incumbent would have to campaign against a fellow incumbent. 2 49
Voters would still be able to "plump" their votes for favored
candidates running for any numbered post, or distribute their votes
among various candidates in different posts as they see fit, thus
enhancing minority voting strength. Although cumulative voting is
normally thought of as being employed in a "pure" at-large setting, it
is possible to implement it with numbered posts or residency
districts.20
Such a numbered post scheme would satisfy the "collegiality"
concerns discussed in Eleventh and Fifth Circuit cases. To the extent
such a scheme made matters safer or more pleasant for incumbents,
of course, it could arguably discourage lawyers from entering judicial
election contests as challengers. However, this "problem"-if it is
indeed a problem-stems directly from the contradictory complaints
of Judge Tjoflat in Sessions and Nipper regarding cumulative voting
248. A residency district feature would require each candidate to declare for a
numbered seat, determined by the geographic location within the jurisdiction where that
candidate happens to reside. Unlike with a single-member district, however, voters from
all over the jurisdiction would be able to cast ballots for candidates from that residency
district. The residency district thus constricts the candidate's options more than the
voter's. If it were considered important to ensure that all the judges from a jurisdiction
did not come from the same small area within the jurisdiction, but rather came from all
areas within the jurisdiction, residency districts would be preferable to numbered posts.
For example, the defendant jurisdiction in Cane v. Worcester County, 35 F.3d 921 (4th Cir.
1994), considered such geographic diversity to be important in its county commission
electoral scheme, which featured residency districts. See id. at 928. If such geographic
diversity were not considered important, numbered posts would be equally desirable to
residency districts. Because candidates placed on the ballot according to residency
districts would still have to appeal to voters from all over the jurisdiction, the "linkage"
interest discussed above would not be disrupted.
249. It is true that this system would still allow incumbent judges to "compete" against
each other in the limited sense that an incumbent could ask voters to "plump" all of their
votes for that incumbent and not provide any votes to any other incumbent (or any other
challenger, for that matter). While a numbered post system still allows for competition
among incumbents, however, it makes it easy for incumbents to run together and win
together-or, at least, to stay out of each other's way.
250. Indeed, the jurisdiction of Andrews, Texas, adopted such a numbered post
cumulative voting system and obtained preclearance of it under section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act. See City of Andrews v. Reno, No. 1:95CV01477 (D.D.C. Jan. 29, 1996) (threejudge court) (consent decree).
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in judicial elections: Advantages to incumbents are necessarily
disadvantages to challengers, and vice versa?21
Valid criticisms do exist to the numbered post variation of the
cumulative voting method, however. One criticism is that the use of
numbered posts robs the system of its minority-enhancing effects. As
a theoretical matter, the threshold of exclusion for any given
numbered post would rise to 50%.2 A white majority could always
"plump" votes against a minority-backed candidate in a given post to
ensure the minority candidate's defeat. Such voting profligacy,
however, seems unlikely, as it would sacrifice the white majority's
ability to influence the outcome of electoral races in the other

numbered posts.

This "spoiler" strategy becomes difficult or

impossible for the majority voting bloc when more than one minority

candidate runs in more than one numbered post. As a practical
matter, therefore, the minority-enhancing effects of cumulative voting
under a numbered post system would still be considerable, though not
as great as under a "pure" at-large cumulative voting system. The
election of a minority candidate without opposition in Andrews,
Texas, where such a system is in use, demonstrates this point. 3
A second criticism of this scheme is that it is more likely than

"pure" cumulative voting to allow for the election of a, "stealth"
extremist candidate. One can imagine a scenario in which the voters'
attention is focused on one or two high-profile races in two numbered
posts-a white-black race, for example, or the reelection campaign of
a controversial jurist. If many voters "plump" their votes to influence
the outcome in those races, it might allow an extremist candidate with
a small but devoted following to obtain a narrow victory in a

numbered post with a lower-profile race.

In "pure" cumulative

voting, the argument goes, such an extremist would have to obtain
251. See supra note 241.
252. By definition, within each numbered post race, there can only be one winner. In
such a winner-take-all contest, a candidate needs at least 50% of the vote (plus one vote)
to be assured of victory.
253. Telephone Interview with J. Gerald Hebert, Attorney, City of Andrews (Aug. 16,
1998) (regarding the city's successful effort to obtain "preclearance" under section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act).
Arguably, a white majority's "spoiler" strategy might be more plausible in judicial
elections, where voter interest is generally lower. For example, some white voters may
come to the polls only to defeat a single black candidate in a single numbered post and
may not care about sacrificing their ability to vote for low-profile judicial elections in other
numbered posts. But given the overall track record of minority voters disproportionately
using strategic voting to elect candidates of choice even when they are below the threshold
of exclusion, see supra text accompanying notes 129-33, I do not consider this a very likely
scenario.
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close to the overall threshold of exclusion to get elected.
As with the "spoiler" scenario discussed above, this outcome is
possible, though its likelihood is hard to estimate. First, candidates
sometimes win with shares of the vote far below the threshold of
exclusion even in "pure" cumulative voting elections.Y4 This outcome
becomes more likely and more pronounced as the number of seats to
be filled increases0 5- Thus, the marginal increase in risk may be
overstated. Another problem with this scenario is that the more
extremist the candidate in question is, the more likely his candidacy
will draw attention, making the race in his numbered post one of the
high-profile races in which voters will "plump."
While both of these criticisms are valid, electoral system flaws
are all relative. Although a preference voting or "pure" cumulative
voting system would be a preferable remedy for a dilutive judicial
election system, a modified cumulative voting plan is preferable to a
dilutive winner-take-all system.
These criticisms of cumulative voting are likely rooted in the
courts' overall hostility to the idea of section 2 liability of any kind in
the context of judicial elections. Although the Supreme Court has
clearly held that section 2 applies to state judicial elections,256 lower
courts have been extremely reluctant to allow a section 2 claim to
succeed2 7 Because a key liability issue has been whether a remedy
exists that is compatible with the state's peculiar governmental
interests regarding judicial elections,25s courts have had an incentive
to devise reasons why alternative electoral schemes fail this test.259
254. Telephone Interview with Robert Richie, Executive Director, Center for Voting
& Democracy (Aug. 15, 1998).
255. Id.
256. See Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 501 U.S. 419, 425-26 (1991);
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380,404 (1991).
257. See Davis v. Chiles, 139 F.3d 1414, 1423-24 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating that the court
was "troubled" by prior Eleventh Circuit decisions that have placed "an insurmountable
weight" on the linkage interest and that have categorically rejected every conceivable
form of remedial plan, such that section 2 "frankly cannot be said to apply, in any
meaningful way, to at-large judicial elections"), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1139 (1999);
Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v. Thompson, 116 F.3d 1194, 1200 (7th Cir. 1997)
(describing the law of the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits as stating that the
"powerful" linkage interest consideration would almost always be "dispositive" of a
section 2 claim "unless the plaintiffs show gross racial vote dilution"), cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 853 (1998).
258. See, e.g., Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1547 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc)
(Edmondson, J., concurring) (agreeing that liability cannot be found due to unique judicial
election concerns foreclosing the availability of any appropriate remedy).
259. See Davis, 139 F.3d at 1423 (describing systematic disallowal in the various
Eleventh Circuit cases of "redistricting, subdistricting, modified subdistricting, cumulative
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Criticisms of alternative remedies that appear in judicial election
cases, even when such criticism might apply by their terms outside the
judicial election context, should be viewed against the backdrop of
this special hostility to section 2 liability.
The discussion in Cousin v. Sundquist"'° rejecting cumulative
voting is perhaps the best example of this perspective. Like some
opinions from other circuits, the opinion of the court in Sundquist
goes beyond the "collegiality" issue to raise more general,
fundamental concerns. Specifically, the court noted that cumulative
voting, like districting, would fuel the perception that racial
considerations influenced the administration of justice. 261 Similarly,
the court confessed to be troubled by the idea that the absence of
black judges on the bench was necessarily a problem in the first place,
emphasizing that "judges are not representatives who can or should
solicit votes to further their political aims. '262 In sum, the court
seemed more concerned with the fact that judges are elected rather
than appointed and that section 2 even applies to such electoral
contests. Cumulative voting appears to be mere collateral damage in
the carpet bombing of this judicial opinion.
CONCLUSION

Alternative electoral systems are not simply possible remedies
for minority vote dilution-they are preferable remedies. Litigants
and courts should use them not only when district remedies are
demographically impossible, but also-absent special circumstanceswhenever state law concerns allow them and the defendant
jurisdiction's clearly stated policy preferences do not forbid them.
Such remedies are particularly appropriate in judicial election cases,
in which they can serve the jurisdiction's "linkage" interest. The
alternative electoral schemes can be fine-tuned to address any
concerns courts or others may have regarding collegiality among
judges, the encouragement or discouragement of qualified candidates,
and the danger of electing "fringe" candidates.
voting, limited voting, special nomination, and any conceivable variant thereof").
260. 145 F.3d 818 (6th Cir. 1998), cert denied, 119 S. Ct. 1026 (1999). For further
discussion of Sundquist, see supra notes 107-16 and accompanying text.
261. See Davis, 139 F.3d. at 830 (quoting Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1546). In the Shaw line of
cases, of course, courts-including the Supreme Court-have expressed exactly the same
concern regarding the influence of race on legislative decisionmaking. Nonetheless, courts
have not foreclosed the use of minority districts, as has been done in the judicial election

context.
262. Id. at 831.
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Although the consideration of any of the three alternative
electoral systems would be a dramatic step in the right direction, I
believe that the best system of the three used in the United States is
preference voting. It maximizes proportionality of representation
and the incentive for cross-racial and other coalitions while
minimizing the problems of strategic voting and intra-group
competition. Just as workable legal standards likewise exist to
establish liability when non-district remedies are sought for minority
vote dilution, workable legal standards exist to guide courts as they
craft remedies in response to such claims. The existence of such legal
standards buttresses the policy arguments favoring the use of such
systems. The policy arguments against their use often are rooted
merely in unfamiliarity with these systems or in simple resistance to
change.
As we enter a new round of census-triggered redistricting, courts,
litigants, commentators, and policymakers should adopt these new
approaches to the old problems of majority tyranny and electoral
gerrymandering. In doing so, they could provide both a badly needed
solution to minority vote dilution and a badly needed revitalization of
American democracy.

